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Brian Leiter has recently reflected critically on a practice of religious
accommodation to which some liberal polities—notably the United
States—are committed as a matter of legal mandate. 1 The kind of
accommodation he has in mind has at least the following two features:
the state exempts religious objectors from otherwise binding legal
requirements, and in so doing, the state imposes nontrivial burdens on
others not so accommodated.2 So understood, accommodation constitutes a
kind of privileged, beneficial treatment.3 It is, moreover, privileged
treatment that only the religious enjoy; those who object on religious
grounds enjoy the benefits of accommodation, but not those who object
on secular grounds.4 But, says Leiter, religion does not warrant that kind
of privileged, differentially distributed treatment.5 As a consequence,
the state should, as a matter of law, treat religious objectors no differently
than the state should treat secular objectors.6 That is, the state should
accommodate both the religious and the secular, neither the religious nor
the secular, but not one or the other.7 And at the end of the day, Leiter
settles for a version of the neither option8: “[T]here should not be exemptions
to general laws with neutral purposes, unless those exemptions do not
shift burdens or risks onto others.”9
Crucial to Leiter’s overall case is the claim that there is no credible
reason to accommodate religious objectors but not secular objectors:
“[N]o one has been able to articulate a credible principled argument . . .
that would explain why . . . we ought to accord special legal and moral
1. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 5 (2013). The legal mandate I have
in mind is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2012). As I understand it, RFRA imposes a demanding test on any and all
enactments of the federal government, that is, should the federal government impose
some substantial burden on religion, then it must do so in order to fulfill a compelling
governmental interest and it must do so by employing the least restrictive means to
achieving that interest. Id. § 2000bb-1(b). As I understand it, the RFRA test sometimes
requires that religious objectors, and only religious objectors, be exempted from laws for
which there is a fully sufficient justifying rationale. In some of those cases, the granting
of an exemption shifts the burdens or risks onto others.
2. LEITER, supra note 1, at 93, 99.
3. See id. at 7.
4. Id. at 93.
5. Id. at 66–67.
6. Id. at 92.
7. Id. at 93, 100–01.
8. Id. at 130–31.
9. Id. at 4. As this citation indicates, Leiter has no problem with the state’s
exempting objectors from complying with legal requirements when an exemption is
available to both religious and secular objectors and when granting an exemption imposes no
costs on others, say, for example, exemptions from uniform requirements. See id. at 162
n.11. I will not always mark the latter qualification in the ensuing discussion, but it
should be assumed.
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treatment to religious practices.”10 He reaches this skeptical conclusion,
in significant part, because he takes religion to be afflicted with a troubling
defect, that is, religion involves commitment to categorical demands that
are insulated from scientific and commonsensical scrutiny.11 But, I will
argue, there is no good reason to believe that religion characteristically
involves a commitment on the part of religious believers to insulate their
normative convictions from critical scrutiny—scientific, commonsensical,
or otherwise. I will also argue that, absent that supposed defect, one of
the arguments canvassed by Leiter provides a credible consequentialist
rationale for religious accommodation. That secular argument, I believe,
can be amplified by various and sundry religious considerations. I conclude
that the combination of these secular and religious considerations provides a
credible overall case in favor of accommodating religious objectors, though
not uniquely accommodating them. I take it that this marriage between
religious and secular considerations is a normal and desirable, even if
not obligatory, basis for the kind of political practice under discussion.
Before I set about explicating Leiter’s skeptical challenge to advocates
of religious accommodation, let me specify from the outset the respect in
which I respond to that challenge. Leiter’s denial that anyone has ever
articulated even a credible moral argument for the state to accord privileged
treatment to religion is crucial to his overall case against religious
accommodation.12 But he does not specify what he means by a credible
argument.13 I take him to mean something like an argument that is worth
taking seriously by morally and epistemically competent peers. As such,
an argument can be credible—or what seems to be its equivalent
plausible—without being sound, much less persuasive to all comers, or
even persuasive to Leiter.14 In order to respond to his skepticism, we
10. Id. at 7.
11. See id. at 33–34.
12. See id. at 66–67, 93.
13. He does provide a number of exemplary cases. For example, the private space
argument I soon discuss counts as a credible rationale for a general practice of toleration.
See infra Part I. It is clearly nothing like a Cartesian demonstration.
14. The fact that Leiter demands only credibility and not demonstration explains
why he articulates a number of distinct arguments for a policy of generalized
toleration—Rawlsian and utilitarian arguments. Presumably, Leiter does not adopt this
ecumenical approach because he thinks—or expects his readers to think—that both the
Rawlsian and the utilitarian arguments are sound, much less that both are
demonstrations. Rather, I take him to be of the view that each argument is such as to
provide reasonable, sensible people with adequate moral reason to affirm a policy of
generalized toleration. Moreover, I take Leiter to be of the view that there are no
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need to identify some decent, sensible rationale for religious accommodation,
not a Cartesian demonstration of the legitimacy thereof, not an argument
that is acceptable to all reasonable citizens, and not even a rationale that
persuades Leiter.
I am quite confident that I can offer nothing like an argument that is
acceptable to all reasonable citizens—much less a Cartesian demonstration.
I have no such argument to offer on any topic of note, and certainly not
the topic at hand. Much to the contrary, many will disagree, and sensibly
so, with the rationale that I develop herein—both as to whether it is sound
and even as to whether it is credible. As I see it, this is entirely normal
and expected. Many of the political controversies that roil pluralistic liberal
polities such as the United States are such that we should expect to find
that epistemic peers disagree with one another not only as to how to
resolve those controversies but also as to whether their ideological
competitors have credible reason for their side of the disagreement.15
I. A PRIVATE SPACE ARGUMENT FOR GENERALIZED TOLERATION
Leiter begins his brief against religious accommodation by articulating
a number of arguments in favor of a generalized policy of state
toleration.16 I begin my explication of Leiter’s case by discussing one of
them, his “private space” argument. It is easily put: “[B]eing able to
choose what to believe and how to live . . . makes for a better life.”17
Ordinarily, human beings are happier, are more fulfilled, and lead lives
arguments that meet even this relaxed standard in favor of a policy that accords religion
special, beneficial treatment.
15. So, to anticipate, a credible case for religious accommodation might include
religious premises, despite the fact that many epistemic and moral peers sensibly reject
those premises.
16. Toleration and accommodation denote distinct practices, both of which
involve “putting up with” objectionable beliefs or lifestyles. See LEITER, supra note 1, at
3. As I understand it, toleration is a matter of broad abstention: certain beliefs or ways of
life are seriously defective in some respect, and the state could effectively suppress them
absent unacceptable cost but refrains from doing so anyway. Accommodation is a matter
of narrow abstention: the state enacts a given law, L, enforces L with coercive measures
of various sorts, and so does not tolerate whatever L precludes, but exempts some who
object to L, and so abstains from coercing them to comply. See id. at 14. So understood,
it is plausible to suppose that the state can coherently tolerate what it does not
accommodate. This is, roughly, Leiter’s view: generalized toleration absent burdenshifting accommodation. See id. at 118–19, 133. The reverse—accommodation absent
toleration—does not seem morally coherent. At least, it seems wildly implausible. If the
state will not even tolerate citizens’ adhering to some objectionable way of life and so
deliberately tries to prevent them from doing so by employing some coercive means,
what adequate moral reason could the state have to accommodate them—and so exempt
them from the very laws that are supposed to bring them into line?
17. Id. at 17–18 (emphasis omitted).
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more meaningful to themselves when they are not forced to adhere to
state-mandated beliefs or lifestyles. Moreover, “[b]eing told what you
must believe and how you must live, conversely, make lives worse.”18
Ordinarily, human beings are alienated, angered, and frustrated when the
state compels them to believe or live contrary to inclination or conviction.
Consequently, when the state accords each citizen the latitude to believe
and live as each sees fit, at least when it does so within broad limits, the
state adopts a general practice that maximizes net happiness.19 If this is
the case, then we have broadly consequentialist reason to affirm a practice
of state toleration; even when citizens affirm false or strange beliefs or
pursue an unworthy or corrupt lifestyle, the state should, within broad
limits, abstain from intervening.20
Note three features of this argument. First, it provides a principled
reason to affirm a practice of toleration and thus a rationale that does not
depend merely on considerations of incapacity, incompetence, or political
advantage. Thus, if the private space argument is sound, the state should
allow citizens to believe and live as they see fit, within broad constraints,
even when it can deter them from forming objectionable beliefs, even when
it has the competence to discriminate between worthy and unworthy
ways of life, and even when suppression would not elicit a debilitating
reaction.21 Second, it constitutes a plausible, principled rationale for a
practice of state toleration.22 Although he realizes that some citizens might
“make themselves miserable” by making “foolish choices about what to

18. Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).
19. See id. Leiter construes this argument as utilitarian, but I see good reason to
understand it as a generically consequentialist argument and thus one that includes as
relevant to moral assessment a broad variety of axiological considerations—not merely
desire or preference satisfaction but also truth acquisition, virtuous or vicious epistemic
activity, civic virtue, and the like.
20. The conclusion of this argument has a very wide scope: it mandates toleration
not only of objectionable conscience but also of objectionable desire, preference, or
lifestyle.
21. “Where a genuine ‘principle of toleration’ gets its purchase is in the cases
where one group (call it the ‘dominant’ group) actively disapproves of what another
group (call it the ‘disfavored’ group) believes or does; where that dominant group has the
means at its disposal to effectively and reliably change or end the disfavored group’s
beliefs or practices; and yet still the dominant group acknowledges that there are moral
or epistemic reasons . . . to permit the disfavored group to keep on believing and doing
what it does.” LEITER, supra note 1, at 13.
22. Id. at 18.
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believe and how to live”23 or by having to make such choices even when
not foolish, Leiter grants that we may judge that these negative consequences
are sufficiently counterbalanced by ample positive consequences. No
doubt this judgment depends on some very contentious claims—difficult
tradeoffs, tenuous axiological comparisons, and hazy predictions. The
fact that Leiter’s private space argument depends on such claims helps to
explain why it does not demonstrate its conclusion to all epistemically
competent and morally conscientious peers. Nevertheless, difficult tradeoffs,
tenuous axiological comparisons, and hazy predictions accompany all
kinds of legitimate arguments that bear on significant state policies, and
so we cannot sensibly dismiss the private space argument simply on that
account.
Third, it provides a plausible, principled rationale for a general policy
of state toleration—a policy that applies to belief and lifestyle whether
religious or secular. It seems plausible to suppose that religious and
secular citizens will find “being told what to believe and how to live” by
the state equally alienating, frustrating, or angering. Given this parity claim,
there is no reason to believe that tolerating only the religious has better
consequences than tolerating both the religious and the secular, and so
the state should tolerate both, again, within broad constraints.
The private space argument exemplifies Leiter’s understanding of
what an acceptable argument for toleration looks like: principled, plausible,
and general. Having vindicated a policy of generalized toleration, Leiter
wants to know whether or not any argument is similar to the private
space argument with respect to principle and plausibility but not generality.
That is, he wants to determine whether or not there are credible moral
grounds for the state to tolerate religion in particular, that is, toleration as
accommodation. So the search is on for some feature that distinguishes the
religious from the secular by virtue of which the state ought to accord the
former beneficial treatment that it does not extend to the latter. As I
noted at the outset, Leiter believes that this search is fruitless; there is no
credible moral argument to the conclusion that the state ought to tolerate
the religious that does not also establish the conclusion that the state
ought to tolerate the secular, so there is no credible reason for any policy
other than the state ought to tolerate the religious and the secular equally.24
23. Id.
24. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. I should note that, even if there is
no credible argument for the conclusion that the state ought to accord religion special,
beneficial treatment, it could be the case that there is a credible argument to the weaker
conclusion that the state may accord such treatment. So, for example, if we conclude
that serious and weighty consequentialist considerations count for and against some such
policy, and if we judge that those considerations roughly balance out, then we might
conclude that the state may, but is not required to, accord religion special, beneficial
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II. LEITER’S DIALECTICAL STRATEGY
How does Leiter go about vindicating this skeptical conclusion? Let
me say a few general words about Leiter’s overall dialectical strategy
before I discuss some of the details of his argument.
There is a rather direct line of argument that we might reasonably take
to vindicate Leiter’s core commitment that the state ought equally to
tolerate the religious and the secular. Simply put, differential treatment
absent relevant difference is objectionably arbitrary, there are no
normatively relevant differences between the religious and the secular,
and thus the state should treat the religious no differently than the secular,
and so the state ought to tolerate the religious and secular equally. In the
service of this argument, we might avail ourselves of any number of
parity claims. Religious doctrines are not more or less popular than secular
doctrines. A religious way of life is no more and no less subjectively
meaningful or important to its adherents than is a secular way of life.
Religious citizens are no more and no less rational, moral, happy, or
productive than secular citizens. Given various and sundry parity claims,
and given that there are no important and relevant differences between
the religious and the secular, the state should treat them equally.25 In
short, given parity across the board, then no privilege; if no privilege,

treatment. Although I will later articulate a consequentialist argument to accommodate
religion, I do not pursue that possibility in detail.
25. A narrow parity claim in the vicinity seems to me to be very plausible, that is,
that there are no epistemically important differences between religious and secular
reasons—differences that could provide a basis for according to the former some
justificatory role that is different than, and lesser than, that enjoyed by the latter. I have
argued for this parity claim in a number of places. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE,
RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS 333 (2002). I will say something in its
defense in the ensuing discussion. That said, I do not affirm anything like a generalized
parity between the religious and the secular. There is always only parity between the
religious and the secular in certain respects and with respect to certain issues. So, for
example, I believe that religious and secular reasons differ in their content. No parity
there. Moreover, differences in content might lead to differences in motivation, moral
orientation, and practice. This is basically the position that I defend in this paper: the
religious and the secular do not differ with respect to epistemology, they differ in their
variegated understandings of the human condition, and these differing conceptions of the
human condition might have—and seem to me likely to have—any number of politically
relevant consequences that warrant differential treatment by the state.
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then no toleration of religion only; and if no privilege, then no
accommodation of religion only.26
Now we might expect Leiter to take this direct—and to my way of
thinking most promising—route to his favored conclusion.27 After all,
one parity claim lies at the heart of his private space argument: because
being told what to do by the state is no more and no less alienating and
frustrating to secular citizens than it is to religious citizens, the private
space argument should be understood to vindicate a policy of generalized
toleration. But Leiter does not take that rather direct dialectical route.
Rather, he insists that religion is special. It is especially defective—
defective in its epistemology. Religion is epistemically defective in the
respect that religious adherents believe that they ought to insulate certain
convictions from scientific and commonsensical scrutiny. More on this
shortly.
Now it might seem that imputing significant defects to religion is a most
unpromising basis for Leiter’s commitment to equal toleration. After all,
the defect that Leiter imputes to religion might seem to provide reason for
intolerance: to suppress religion, to disfavor it, or to quarantine it in the
private lives of the pious. This is the kind of view associated with a number
of vocal antitheologians.28 But Leiter does not draw this dubious and

26. This line of argument can be significantly aided by the familiar difficulty of
defining religion. A difficulty that can, so far as I can tell, be settled only with the help
of some substantial stipulatory component. If we take advantage of that difficulty by
stipulating a most expansive conception of what makes for the religious, such as “a
person’s religion is whatever is most subjectively important to them,” then it will be
exceedingly implausible to suppose that there are any normatively significant differences
between the religious and the secular. It is no doubt the case that some secular concerns
matter to some citizens more—far more—than some religious concerns matter to some
religious citizens. Contrast the passion for a beloved soccer team exhibited by its fanatical
supporters with the tepid piety exhibited by nominal churchgoers. Conversely, it seems
to me that if we define religion rather narrowly, then we might sensibly accord the religious
special treatment. The question will be, roughly, whether or not we have reason to think that
religion, construed in that narrow way, is “good” or “bad” in respects that differentiate the
religious from the nonreligious. All this is just to make the obvious point: whether or not
the state’s privileged, beneficial treatment of religion can be justified depends, at least in
significant part, on our underlying understanding of what makes for religion.
27. This is a route taken, I believe, by a number of theorists, each of whom argues
that precisely because there are no morally, socially, epistemically, or politically relevant
differences between the secular and the religious, the state ought not accommodate the
religious but not the secular. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD
105–47 (2013); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND THE CONSTITUTION 78–120 (2007); JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR,
SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 85–99 (Jane Marie Todd trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 2011) (2010); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Conscience as Religious and
Moral Freedom, 29 J.L. & RELIGION 124 (2014).
28. See LEITER, supra note 1, at 59.
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illiberal conclusion.29 He explicitly denies that the epistemic defects that
putatively afflict the religious provide reason for intolerance. This claim,
Leiter insists,
[has] no part of the argument of the book: I have adopted throughout what
seems to me the clearly correct Nietzschean posture—namely, that the falsity of
beliefs and/or their lack of epistemic warrant are not necessarily objections to
those beliefs; indeed, false or unwarranted beliefs are almost certainly . . .
necessary conditions of life itself, and so of considerable value, and certainly
enough value to warrant toleration.30

29. Actually, Leiter claims that there is credible reason for a policy of general
toleration and so for a policy of the state’s putting up with objectionable religious and
secular lifestyles, where Leiter’s conception of putting up with is consistent with what
many others will take to be intolerant practices. See id. at 170 n.37. How so? Leiter
claims that a given state can practice a general policy of toleration and, without the
slightest impropriety, that state can promote a secularist “Vision of the Good.” Id.
A state that promotes such a secularist Vision may shape its educational curriculum
accordingly and so may appeal to that secular Vision as a basis for coercing citizens,
given that the state compels participation in the schools in which that secularist vision is
propounded. So, for example, Leiter believes that a secular state may force children to
take biology classes in which they are indoctrinated into the theory of evolution, despite
the fact that those children, or their parents, have what they regard as compelling reason
to reject that theory. Id. Leiter regards exempting such students from what they regard
as coerced indoctrination as “astonishing”; I think it simple human decency. Id. Indeed,
I think that Leiter’s considered position is far more humane than his explicit judgment about
this case; he takes the view that religious and secular citizens may be accommodated
when doing so does not shift burdens onto others. Id. In my view, exempting students
from biology class imposes no harm—or risk of harm on anyone else—unless pretty
much anything shifts burdens and the qualification is empty. For a fascinating discussion of
related issues, though from a very different theoretical perspective than my own public
reason liberalism, see KEVIN VALLIER, LIBERAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC FAITH: BEYOND
SEPARATION 237–53 (2014).
30. LEITER, supra note 1, at 91. Leiter eventually asserts that religious believers
are epistemically culpable for their continued adherence to beliefs such as that there
exists “an omniscient, omnipotent, nonmaterial being.” Id. at 78. As with belief that
“the Hale-Bopp comet is a recycling facility for dead Californians,” which “no one in
their right mind should accept,” religious belief, such as belief in God, is a “culpable
form of unwarranted belief” given the “ordinary standards of reasons and evidence”
appropriate to denizens of the twenty-first century. Id. at 78, 81 (emphasis omitted). But
there seems to me to be a tension between Leiter’s Nietzschean claim that adherence to
unwarranted beliefs is a necessary condition of life itself and his claim that those who
adhere to religious convictions are epistemically culpable. After all, it is very plausible
to suppose that necessity is a defense against culpability. This is the case not only in
morality but also in epistemology. I doubt that there is a sharp distinction between the
two. If S cannot but form his beliefs in a certain way, for example, he is afflicted with a
brain lesion that compels him to believe that he is always the smartest person in the
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Well, then what role does Leiter’s appeal to the distinctive defects of
religion play in his argument? It functions as a defeater for arguments
that putatively count in favor of religious accommodation. Bluntly put,
the distinctive defects that Leiter attributes to religion defeat arguments
for religious privilege but do not license intolerance. In order to see how
Leiter’s defeater is supposed to work, let me move from dialectical strategy
to argumentative particulars.
III. LEITER’S CONJUNCTIVE CONCEPTION OF “THE RELIGIOUS”
It seems to me that Leiter regards a somewhat vague and amorphous
consequentialist argument as one of the most promising on offer for the
claim that the state may, or even should, accord religion special, beneficial
treatment.31 His formulation of that argument, sensibly enough, depends
on his understanding of what makes for religion. If he is correct, religion
has three constitutive features: categoricity, insularity, and consolation.
I discuss each of these in turn, suggest two friendly amendments, and then
explain how Leiter’s conjunctive understanding of what makes for religion
shapes his understanding and assessment of that consequentialist argument.
First, religion provides its adherents with requirements that have
distinctive normative force: “[F]or all religions, there are at least some
beliefs . . . that issue in categorical demands on action.”32 What is a
categorical demand? One that “must be satisfied no matter what an
individual’s antecedent desires and no matter what incentives or
disincentives the world offers up.”33 This formulation seems to indicate
that Leiter understands a categorical demand as a requirement that enjoys a
kind of normative precedence. Suppose that Marcus morally ought not
to kill innocent and nonthreatening human beings, and yet he must kill
an innocent and nonthreatening goatherd if he is to eliminate a serious

discussion, then we can hardly blame him for forming that belief, however obvious it is
that his self-assessment is wildly at odds with reality and however little warrant he has
for that belief. Correlatively, if S’s unwarranted belief in God is necessary to S’s life,
then how can S be culpable for believing in God? S might be wrong to do so, wrong in
the sense of having violated some intellectual obligation or epistemic duty. But he
cannot be blameworthy. Well, perhaps “cannot” is too strong, but it is hard to tell given
that Leiter is none too clear as to the respects in which false or unwarranted beliefs are
necessary conditions of life itself.
31. So far as I can tell, Leiter does not distinguish between the claim that the state
is permitted to accord religion privileged, beneficial treatment and the claim that the state
ought to do so. It seems to me that a consequentialist argument for religious accommodation
could vindicate either claim, or both, of course.
32. LEITER, supra note 1, at 33–34 (emphasis omitted).
33. Id. at 34.
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threat to those with whom he is closely bonded.34 If moral requirements
are categorical, then Marcus’s obligation not to kill the goatherd takes
precedence over the very weighty considerations of personal well-being
that count in favor of doing so, and thus Marcus must, all reasons
considered, refrain from killing the goatherd. On this understanding, a
categorical requirement is tantamount to an overriding requirement, that
is, one that determines how one ought to act even given competing kinds
of normative considerations, such as those of self-interest.35
So does Leiter claim that religion is distinctive in that adherents believe in
demands that putatively take precedence over competing kinds of
consideration? No. After all, many secular theorists, such as Kant, have
asserted that moral obligations have overriding normative weight and so
are theoretically committed to the claim that human beings are bound by
categorical demands. 36 That said, it is one thing to believe that some
requirement is overriding and quite another to experience it as overriding.
According to Leiter, the latter is a locus of religious distinctiveness:
“Categoricity, it is important to emphasize, will be treated primarily as a
property of how the religious commands are experienced by believers,
though often enough the experience will track the formulation of religious
or theological doctrine.”37
If Leiter is correct, religion provides its adherents with norms that are
not merely theorized as categorical but felt, apprehended, or experienced
34. A scenario of this sort lies at the heart of a story of great interest to many of
my students. See generally MARCUS LUTTRELL WITH PATRICK ROBINSON, LONE SURVIVOR:
THE EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF OPERATION REDWING AND THE LOST HEROES OF SEAL
TEAM 10 (2007) (recounting the heroic tale of four United States Navy SEALs and their
desperate battle in Afghanistan mountains that led to the largest loss of life in Navy
SEAL history).
35. It seems to me that we best understand the notion of overridingness by
reference to competing considerations of different kinds rather than, say, by reference to
just any competing normative consideration. So, for example, when we say that moral
requirements are overriding, we do not mean that a given moral requirement takes
precedence over competing moral considerations, but that it takes precedence over
competing nonmoral kinds of consideration, say, those of self-interest, communal wellbeing, legal rectitude, or whatever. On this understanding, overridingness comes in degrees:
if reasons of kind X override reasons of kind Y but not of kind Z, then reasons of kind X
are not absolutely overriding. Presumably, the more distinct kinds of reasons X-reasons
override, the greater the degree of overridingness. If X-reasons override all other kinds
of competing reasons, then X-reasons are absolutely overriding. Of course, individuating the
distinct kinds of reasons is no small task.
36. See LEITER, supra note 1, at 38, 50.
37. Id. at 34.
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as such. This is why religious actors are disproportionately willing to
sacrifice their personal well-being for moral principle:
What is interesting and important about religion is that
systems of belief that gives effect to this categoricity.
agents are few and far between . . . but those who genuinely
accord with the categoricity of the moral demands
overwhelmingly religious.38

it is one of the few
Pure Kantian moral
conduct their lives in
they recognize are

Distinctiveness is, however, not the same as uniqueness, and Leiter insists
that religious actors are not the only ones who experience moral demands as
categorical. 39 He notes, in particular, communists who sacrificed a
great deal to resist Nazi tyranny.40 So I take Leiter’s considered view to be
that religion is distinctive, but not unique, in providing motivational
urgency to norms that are theorized as overriding by both secular and
religious folk.
Second, religion incorporates claims that are insulated from
commonsensical and scientific scrutiny: “Religious beliefs, in virtue of
being based on ‘faith,’ are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence
and rational justification, the ones we employ in both common sense and
in science.”41 What does it mean to insulate a given religious belief, and
what is it exactly that religious believers are supposed to insulate their
beliefs from? Surprisingly, given the importance of his insulation claim
to his argument, Leiter does not answer those questions with anything
approaching systematic detail or even with one clear canonical statement.
As a consequence, we are left to interpret his occasional—and sometimes
cryptic—judgments about one or another case.
I judge that what Leiter has in mind, most centrally, by the claim that
religion involves insulation from evidence, is that religious folk are
unwilling to revise certain beliefs in light of certain kinds of evidence.
So, for example, on Leiter’s accounting, Marx offered what Marx took
to be a scientific account of historical change, and as such, Marx’s central
theoretical claims were vulnerable to empirical counterexample. Eventually,
the accumulation of counterevidence acquired by familiar historical and
economic analysis required the revision or abandonment of at least some
of those central theoretical claims, namely, to historical materialism.
This commitment to revise core claims in light of scientific
counterevidence is part of what distinguishes Marxism from religion:
“Marxism took itself to be answering to—not insulated from—standards

38.
39.
40.
41.
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of evidence . . . in a way religion has not.”42 Even with respect to supposedly
intellectualist religious traditions, Leiter asserts, “it never turns out that
the fundamental beliefs are revised in light of new evidence.”43 Citizens
of faith do not revise or jettison their core theological commitments
under pressure from the kind of empirical evidence that forced Marxists
to revise or repudiate Marx’s understanding of the manner in which
technological and productive substructure shapes cultural and political
superstructure. In short, the “distinctively religious state of mind is that
of” faith, and faith is “believing something notwithstanding the evidence
and reasons that fail to support it or even contradict it.”44
Given the importance of Leiter’s insulation claim to his argument, we
should formulate it as sympathetically as possible. To that end, let me
note that, although Leiter sometimes fails to qualify the claim that the
religious insulate their convictions from scientific and commonsensical
scrutiny, his considered position is that they do so with respect to only
some of them: all major religions “countenance at least some central beliefs
that are not ultimately answerable to evidence and reasons as these are
understood . . . in common sense and in science.”45 Again, although Leiter
42. Id. at 38.
43. Id. at 40.
44. Id. at 39. Note that this last statement includes two importantly distinct
assertions about the respect in which the religious putatively insulate their convictions:
faith involves belief in the absence of evidence and faith involves belief despite evidence
to the contrary. These assertions denote two very different epistemic conditions. It is
one thing for me to trust the uncorroborated testimony of some authority that an event in
the distant past has occurred, say, a putative resurrection, and something very different
for me to trust that testimony no matter how much empirical evidence accumulates that
the event never occurred. For example, we find bodily remains in a properly marked
tomb—name and all—and subsequently find multiple independently written confessions
that the whole thing was a hoax. Belief in the absence of evidence is one thing, but belief no
matter how compelling the contrary evidence is quite another. I think that religious faith
involves the first kind of “insular” belief, and in that respect religious adherents form
their convictions just as does any other rational agent, for we must all accept some beliefs
absent evidence. Religious faith need not involve, and sometimes does not involve, the
second kind of insular belief. Much to the contrary, a commitment to revise beliefs in
light of counterevidence of various sorts—certainly including that of common sense—is
entirely natural for religious believers. More on this when I discuss Leiter’s assessment
of “reformed epistemology,” to which the rough distinction I have just drawn is crucial.
See infra Part VI.
45. Id. (emphasis added). Of course, this formulation does not exactly say that
religious believers exempt only some of their convictions from scientific and commonsensical
scrutiny—”at least some” is not equivalent to “only some” and is consistent with “all,”
not to mention “almost all” and “most.” Nevertheless, that this is Leiter’s considered view
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sometimes seems to understand his insulation claim as a description of
how religious folk actually govern their beliefs, his considered
understanding of that claim is that it describes how religious citizens
believe that they ought to govern their beliefs. That is, Leiter’s insulation
claim does not describe how adherents actually regulate their religious
convictions, and it certainly does not specify how they ought to do so;
rather, it describes how they believe they ought to regulate their religious
convictions.46 In short, it is a claim that religious adherents are committed
to an epistemic norm that they take to apply to some of their religious
convictions, that is, those particular convictions ought not be jettisoned
or revised in response to commonsensical and scientific scrutiny.
Third, religion provides consolation and comfort in the midst of the
many sorrows endemic to ordinary human existence. This is familiar
territory. The life of even the most privileged human being is replete with
disappointment, tragedy, loneliness, frustration, and unfulfilled desire.
The lives of those not so privileged are in addition often afflicted with
hunger, economically induced anxiety, mind numbingly boring work,
hopelessness, and so on. Paradigm cases of religion explain why that is
the case, provide some understanding as to the point or purpose of the
suffering to which human beings are subject, and typically provide some
account of what to do to rectify that condition. For both the privileged
and the marginalized, religion provides hope, meaning, and consolation.
So what distinguishes religion from, say, a personality cult of the Maoist
variety is not merely categoricity and “insulation from evidence, but also
that there are some beliefs in the religion that . . . render intelligible and

is clear from his response to a rough but fair-minded review by Susan Mendus. See
Brian Leiter, Susan Mendus Did Not Like “Why Tolerate Religion?,” LEITER REPORTS
(Sept. 17, 2013, 5:56 AM), http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2013/09/susan-mendusdid-not-like-why-tolerate-religion.html. My thanks to Michael Perry for informing me
about this blog post.
46. See LEITER, supra note 1, at 35, 39. There is excellent reason for Leiter to
formulate his insulation claim as a matter of epistemic norm rather than practice. It is
obviously possible that secular folks are just as insular about their convictions as Leiter
claims that religious folk believe they ought to be. A “fanatical defender of the theory of
gravity” might actually refuse to consider evidence that casts doubt on their theory, and
in that respect, differs not at all from a religious believer who refuses to consider relevant
objections to their belief that God exists. See id. at 35. But the former is presumably not
committed to the claim that she ought not consider counterevidence, whereas the latter is
so committed. See id. So, at least, Leiter contends. Whether the religious actually insulate
their beliefs and whether they do so to a greater degree than those who do not believe
they ought to do so are empirical questions to which Leiter does not attempt to provide
an answer. Sensibly so, it seems to me, for acquiring the evidence needed to answer
those empirical questions is a most daunting task.

990

Religion and Insularity

[VOL. 51: 977, 2014]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

tolerable the basic existential facts about human life, such as suffering
and death.”47
IV. TWO FRIENDLY AMENDMENTS
So much for Leiter’s account of the constitutive features of religion.
I will have some fairly critical things to say about that account. But before I
have at it, let me offer two friendly amendments.
Leiter mentions an additional feature that we might think helps to limn
the boundaries that circumscribe the religious; namely, that religious belief
involves, whether implicitly or explicitly, some “metaphysics of ultimate
reality.”48 Religion involves a metaphysics of ultimate reality in the respect
that it incorporates some account of what is most important, valuable, or
choiceworthy for human beings into its understanding of the basic structure
of reality. So, for example, for theists in the Anselmian tradition, God is
a maximally excellent being, friendship with God is the greatest good
available to human beings, and God is also the primordial reality—
responsible for all that exists that is distinct from God.
According to Leiter, valuationally laden metaphysical commitments of
this sort help to explain the normative weight of religious requirements:
The categoricity of commands distinctive of religious beliefs are, in turn, related
to this metaphysics of ultimate reality in the sense that [those commands]
specify what must be done in order for believers to stand in the right kinds of
relations to “ultimate reality”—that is, to the reality that makes their lives
worthwhile and meaningful.49

Given this understanding of the relation between the categoricity of
religious requirements and religious metaphysics, Leiter declines to
include this fourth feature into his understanding of what makes religion
distinctive. Why? Leiter articulates an account of what makes for religion
in order to ascertain whether or not there is credible reason to accord
religion special, beneficial treatment. As a consequence, he incorporates
into his understanding of religion only those features that might be
relevant to the propriety of according special privilege to religion: “[W]e
want to identify religion in such a way that we can see why it has some
moral and possibly legal claim on special treatment.”50 But the appeal to
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 52.
Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 48.
Id. at 30.
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metaphysical ultimacy merely duplicates the categoricity of religious
requirements. It does not, therefore, advance the case for or against special
treatment and so may safely be ignored.
I think that Leiter would do well not to do so. Why? It seems to me
that religious demands have distinctive—amplified—normative force,
and that we can best understand in what respect they are distinctive by
reference to the valuational conceptions of ultimate reality incorporated
into the great religions. It is hard to communicate this point clearly and
with complete generality, so I will make it by reference to the theistic
traditions with which I am most familiar.51 Recall that Leiter understands a
categorical requirement in terms of overridingness, where a requirement
is overriding when it defeats other kinds of normative consideration in
conditions of irremediable conflict.52 As I see it, the potential divergence
between moral requirement and personal well-being that helps to provide
content to the notion of overridingness is alien to familiar theistic
conceptions. How so?
According to familiar theistic conceptions, obedience to God’s
commands will always further the genuine well-being of the obedient.
So, for example, if friendship with God is the greatest good available to
human beings and if that good is achieved by those who comply with
God’s commands, then to comply with God’s commands is thereby to
achieve the greatest good available to human beings. If that is correct, then
there cannot be the kind of conflict between divine command and personal
well-being presupposed by the claim that moral requirements are
overriding; obedience to God’s commands makes available the greatest
good available to human beings and cannot but further the well-being of
the genuinely obedient. Moreover, if the God who commands also
providentially superintends all of created reality, then all normatively
relevant factors point in the same direction, and so there cannot be any
competing considerations for God’s commands to override. Not really.
So conceived, God’s commands do not so much override as they
overwhelm.
I take it that this is not the case with respect to secular conceptions of
morality; they simply do not have the metaphysical resources to vindicate
the claim that the human condition is as friendly to moral requirement as
it is to divine command on familiar theistic conceptions. Consequently,
secular conceptions of morality must envision circumstances in which
moral principle and personal well-being come apart, and it is with respect to
51. I think that we could make essentially this same point with respect to a nonmonotheistic religion such as Buddhism, given its commitment to a cosmic, transgenerational,
karmic system that correlates various rewards and punishments with moral rectitude.
52. See id. at 34.
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such tragic circumstances that the overridingness of moral demands does
its work.53
It seems to me that Leiter might well appeal to the kinds of metaphysical
claims I have just elucidated to explain what seems to me to be a
puzzling feature of his construal of religion. What puzzling feature is that?
Leiter claims that both secular and religious citizens believe in categorical
norms, and both are free to affirm the same theoretical commitment to
overriding requirements. But he grants that religious citizens experience
those overriding requirements with a subjective urgency—a categoricity—
that secular citizens experience only in the exception.54 Given the identity
of theoretical commitment, this differential experience begs for explanation.
Leiter offers none. As I see it, the appeal to metaphysical ultimacy might
provide at least part of that explanation. Religious citizens construe moral
norms not merely as overriding but also as overwhelming. This
theologically shaped construal controls their apprehension of those
norms, and their apprehension explains the experienced normative weight
of those norms.55 So, for example, if violation of moral requirements
forsakes friendship with God, and if forsaking friendship with God is the
greatest evil that can befall human beings, then it is only natural for decently
socialized, properly functioning, and sincerely committed theists to construe
violation of moral requirements as a primary way to betray God and thus
to apprehend the prospect of violating moral principle as overwhelmingly
abhorrent.
Let me mention, more briefly, a second friendly amendment. Leiter’s
portrayal of religion seems to me to be vitiated by a kind of ethereal
individualism. Religion, as he construes it, is a property of particular
human beings who gain solace and guidance from their faith but who

53. A brief word by way of explanation. I have been contrasting the manner in
which familiar sorts of theism conceive of the relation between divine command and
personal well-being and the manner in which familiar sorts of secularism conceive of the
relation between moral requirement and personal well-being. Complicating—though not
compromising, I hope—this simple contrast is the fact that theists ordinarily correlate
divine command with moral requirement. For many theists, moral requirements are
overwhelming because they are in some way associated with divine command, that is,
God’s commands are identical with moral requirements, or they generate moral
requirements, or they overlap with moral requirements that obtain independently of
God’s commands.
54. LEITER, supra note 1, at 36–38.
55. See ROBERT C. ROBERTS, EMOTIONS: AN ESSAY IN AID OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 68
(2003) (relying on the author’s understanding of emotions as concern-based construal).
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could, for anything in Leiter’s account, do so utterly isolated from any
other human being. But, even granted that isolated individualistic
religiosity is a logical possibility, it is an empirical outlier. Human
beings characteristically practice their faith with one another, in community
with others who share their convictions, shape their sensibilities, and
cooperate in achieving common ends.56
It seems to me that Leiter would do well to incorporate this fact into
his construal of religion. Why? The communal aspect of religion helps
to account for some of its morally salient features, which must factor
into any consequentialist rationale for or against religious toleration.57
Most pertinently at this point, the fact that human beings practice their
faith in common helps to explain the experienced urgency of religious
demands: normal, properly functioning, and decently socialized human
beings care deeply about the communal memberships that help to define
their identity. Thus, they care deeply about the beliefs that help to constitute
membership in community and about acting in accord with those beliefs—
not least beliefs about religious demands. Plausibly, then, if religious
demands are experienced as categorical, then this is not only a function
of theological doctrine but also of the role that those doctrines play in
marking membership in communities that matter a great deal to their
members. In short, the distinctive categoricity of religious demands has
both a theological and a social basis.58

56. One central difference between religion and spirituality, in my idiolect at least,
is that the latter is individualistic in respects that the former is not. The radically
subjective, individualistic “Sheilaism” made famous decades ago by Robert Bellah and
his collaborators is not really religion; it is a vague, socially disembodied, and amorphous
spirituality. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 221 (1985). For discussion and complications, particularly
with respect to the “rise of the Nones,” see Mark L. Movsesian, Defining Religion in
American Law: Psychic Sophie and the Rise of the Nones (European Univ. Inst. Robert
Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 19, 2014), available at http://www.
eui.eu/Projects/ReligioWest/Documents/events/workingpaper/RSCAS2014MovsesianIII.pdf.
57. I will eventually refer to sociological evidence that religiosity has beneficial
societal effects. It seems to me that many of those effects are partly to be explained by
the communal membership that is typically associated with sincere religious commitment.
See infra notes 135–142 and accompanying text.
58. At one point, Leiter acknowledges that his construal of religion might seem
too “Protestant,” focusing as it does on individual belief to the exclusion of ritual and
community. LEITER, supra note 1, at 149 n.19. He claims in response that conscientious
belief is what matters for purposes of determining whether or not the state should accord
privileged legal status to religion—conscientious belief putatively merits special privilege
rather than “mindless or habitual behavior.” Id. at 35. But this response seems to me to
be unnecessarily severe. After all, both might matter: sincere, conscientious belief on the
part of individuals and the participation in communities in which sincere belief plays a
defining or constitutive role.
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V. A CONSEQUENTIALIST ASSESSMENT OF RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION
As I noted earlier, Leiter employs his understanding of what makes for
religion to formulate and assess a consequentialist argument in favor of
privileging religion. That argument tracks the three features that
conjunctively distinguish the religious from the secular.
According to Leiter, the categoricity of religious demands “accounts
for both one of the most admirable and one of the most frightening
aspects of religious commitment—namely, the willingness of religiously
motivated believers to act in accordance with religious precepts,
notwithstanding the costs.”59 So, for example, religious believers have
been at the forefront of some of the most important movements for
justice in recent memory: the Protestant theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer
and the Catholic military officer Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg were
among the small German minority who actively resisted Hitler’s genocidal
tyranny; Bishop Desmond Tutu and Pastor Allen Boesak helped to
mobilize opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa; Reverend
Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Council
were central actors in the American civil rights movement in the 1960s;
and so on.60 Plausibly, these religious actors were, in significant part,
willing to risk a great deal to resist injustice because they were gripped
by what they experienced as overwhelmingly weighty religious demands.
In each of these cases, plausibly, sincere religious commitment to
honor God helped produce “moral gems” that merit our admiration
whatever our theological or atheological convictions.61 Moreover, the
morally salutary achievements of religious actors are not limited to the
past; the categoricity of religious demands is presently “responsible for
laudatory and courageous behavior.”62 So, for example, “[i]n capitalist
societies, where market norms increasingly permeate all activities and
values, one of the few sturdy bulwarks, with broad cultural resonance,
against self-enrichment as the only ‘rational’ end remains certain kinds
of deep religious commitment.”63 Plausibly, the fact that religion has the
power to motivate believers to achieve such socially salutary goods must

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 36 & 150 nn.21–22.
See id. at 85–86.
Id. at 60.
Id.
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count in any consequentialist assessment of the manner in which the
state treats religious citizens and institutions.
Fair enough. But it goes without saying that the motivational power
of religious norms is not an unambiguous good. The pious have been
led by sincere religious commitment to engage in the self-sacrificial and
personally injurious defense of injustice: German Christians who lent
theological support to Nazi antisemitism; Dutch Reformed defenders of
racial apartheid; theologically driven racists in the American south; not
to mention those religious fanatics who, in more recent memory, “bomb
abortion clinics and fly airplanes into buildings.”64 “Better carnage than
idolatry” is a normative stance not entirely relegated to the past. In
consequence, the capacity of religion to motivate self-sacrifice for the
cause of moral principle is systematically ambiguous; it motivates some
believers to sacrifice their well-being to further the cause of justice and
others to act in ways that retard it. The implications of this generalization
for any consequentialist argument for religious toleration are apparent:
we cannot reasonably conclude that the categoricity of religious demands
engenders a balance of goods that can vindicate the state’s according
religion special, beneficial treatment. Categoricity is a consequentialist
wash.
What of insulation from evidence? Here, the relevant consequentialist
considerations are rather more direct. Leiter seems willing to countenance
the possibility that insulating some religious claims from commonsensical
and scientific scrutiny has some slight beneficial effect. So, for example, it
is possible that “nonstandard methods” of belief-formation provide access
to important truths that are otherwise unavailable to those who adhere
only to standard modes of belief-formation, such as science and ordinary
sense perception.65 Even so, insulation counts heavily in the consequentialist
balance against the claim that we should accord religion privileged,
beneficial treatment. Leiter mentions a number of relevant considerations.
So, for example, the fact that religious folk insulate certain core claims
from scientific and commonsensical scrutiny has the consequence that
they continue to adhere to beliefs that are clearly false. Indeed, “insulation
from evidence is, to be sure, central to what makes theism possible.”66
Moreover, their adherence to those false claims lacks epistemic warrant
and culpably, so “religious belief is a culpable form of unwarranted belief”
given “ordinary standards of reasons and evidence in common sense and

64.
65.
66.
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the sciences.”67 Perhaps most important to Leiter are the actual and
potential harms engendered not merely by the fact that religious folk
insulate some convictions from the appropriate kind of scrutiny but also
by the fact that they insulate their religious demands from that kind of
scrutiny. Here is Leiter: “If it is true that beliefs that support categorical
demands that are insulated from evidence have potential (perhaps even a
special potential) for harms to well-being—and surely they do—then
that would be reason to doubt whether any [consequentialist] argument
for tolerating religion qua religion will succeed.”68
I understand Leiter to take the view, then, that the categoricity of religion,
considered by itself, does not count for or against privileging religion,
that the insularity of religion, considered by itself, counts somewhat against
privileging religion, and that the combination of categoricity and insularity
counts significantly against privileging religion. Of course, these are all
gross, speculative estimates, but they are no different than the estimates

67. Id. To be clear, Leiter does not mention these considerations in his evaluation
of the consequentialist argument for religious toleration. Rather, he does so in response
to the argument that religion merits a kind appraisal respect that might form the basis for
religious accommodation. But I see no reason not to include such considerations in
Leiter’s assessment of that consequentialist argument, as they are surely relevant. If
religion is associated with epistemic vice, then surely that must count in a broadly
consequentialist assessment of policies that accord special privileges to religion.
68. Id. at 61. I have to say that I find Leiter to be of two minds regarding his
understanding of the potential harms engendered by the concatenation of insularity and
categoricity in religion. In the passage just cited in the text, Leiter asserts that insulation
and categoricity have potential for harms to well-being—surely they do have that
potential and perhaps special potential. Moreover, he is clear that the potential for harm
that arises from the concatenation of categoricity and insulation helps to defeat the
consequentialist argument for religious toleration. See id. at 62–63. Leiter also claims,
however, that “there is no reason to think that beliefs unhinged from reasons and
evidence and that issue in categorical demands on action are especially likely to issue in
‘harm’ to others.” Id. at 83. Perhaps they are, Leiter says, but we need more evidence.
Id. at 84. What, then, is the significance of the claim that insularity and categoricity
potentially engender harm? I suppose that any belief has the potential to play some
causal role in engendering harm to others, including scientific and commonsensical
beliefs—consider the relation between modern physics and nuclear bombs. And any
belief has the potential for good as well, including categorical demands insulated from
evidence. Unless categoricity and insularity have more than mere potential to cause
harm to others, it is unclear why it would even in the slightest tip the consequentialist
calculation against privileging religion. I suspect that when Leiter says that the concatenation
of categoricity and insularity has the potential for harm he really means that it is likely to
engender harm—and indeed that it does in fact harm others—despite the fact that he says
we need more evidence for that claim.
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on which Leiter’s private space argument relies—and a good many other
credible arguments as well. It also bears recalling that Leiter does not
understand his consequentialist argument to provide positive reason not
to tolerate religion; rather, his argument provides only reason that counts
against according religion special, beneficial treatment.
The question is not whether toleration of categorical demands on action
conjoined with insulation from evidence stands in the requisite causal nexus
with harm or infringements of liberty such that we would be justified in not
tolerating those kinds of beliefs. Rather, the question is whether there is any
special reason to tolerate beliefs whose distinctive character is defined by the
categoricity of its demands conjoined with its insulation from evidence.69

Leiter is most definitely of the view that there is no such reason: Surely we
ought not promote “this conjunction of categorical fervor and its basis in
epistemic indifference,” but this is exactly what the state does when it
accords religion privileged, beneficial treatment.70
Now we might think, to the contrary, that “the fact that [religious]
beliefs also provide existential consolation [might] save them from a
[consequentialist] point of view.”71 Leiter seems willing to grant that the
consolation provided to so many ordinary folk by religion is an important
contribution to human well-being and that this contribution must count
in a consequentialist argument in favor of privileging religion.72 We
then face the central question raised by Leiter’s formulation of the
consequentialist argument for religious toleration: Would the fact that
religion provides existential consolation “provide a [consequentialist]
rationale for singling out matters of religious conscience for special
protection, even conceding the potential (perhaps special potential) for
harms to well-being that arise from the conjunction of categorical
demands and insulation from evidence?”73
Here, we find ourselves compelled to speculate. As with Leiter’s private
space argument, so also with respect to the consequentialist calculation
now under discussion, there is no uncontroversial, formulaic way for us
to balance out the goods and bads associated with existential consolation

69. Id. at 60–61.
70. Id. at 63–64.
71. Id. at 61.
72. See id.
73. Id. Leiter also claims that we would need to determine whether or not we
could console ourselves over the death and suffering by which we are beset by adverting
to beliefs and practices that do not involve the insulation of categorical demands that so
disturbs Leiter. If we could so console ourselves, then that would discount the weight of
existential consolation provided by religion in a consequentialist argument for religious
toleration. See id. at 62–63. Because I deny that religion involves the insulation of
categorical demands that Leiter imputes to religion, I will withhold evaluation of that claim.
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and insulated categorical demands. Indeed, those who advocate that the
state privilege religion must “bite the speculative bullet,” namely, that
“the existential consolation functions of religion produce more utility
than the harm produced by the conjunction of categoricity and insulation
[from] evidence.”74 Leiter sees no reason to do so “absent an antecedent
bias in favor of religion.”75
No doubt, Leiter nowhere shows that the harms engendered by the
concatenation of insularity and categoricity outweigh the goods associated
with existential consolation. But he does not need to make that affirmative
showing. This is in keeping with his overall argumentative strategy; he
intends only to defeat arguments in favor of privileging religion and if it
turns out that the consequentialist argument is inconclusive then he has
succeeded in his aims. As I read him, Leiter provides only a defense against
privileging religion rather than a positive argument that we ought not
privilege religion, and this he does by showing that the relevant
considerations do not definitively count in favor of privileging religion.
VI. AGAINST INSULARITY
So much for explication. What should we make of Leiter’s argument?
I hope it is clear that Leiter’s attribution of insularity to religion is crucial to
his case against privileging religion. But there is no good reason to believe
that insulation of that sort is actually characteristic of religion. At least,
Leiter provides us with insufficient reason to believe anything of the sort.
How so?
Let me begin with a methodological point. The claim that the religious
believe that they ought to insulate certain core convictions from scientific
and commonsensical scrutiny is a contingent factual claim. It is a claim
about what the religious believe, hundreds of millions of them, the world
over. It is a claim about what they believe about the epistemic norms
that apply to their religious convictions. As such, Leiter’s insulation claim
cannot be vindicated merely by stipulation. Nor is it the kind of claim
that one can know merely by rational reflection. Any assertion about what
so many human beings believe must be grounded on some kind of empirical
evidence. And, in the nature of the case under discussion, that empirical
evidence is going to be exceedingly hard to come by; many of us have at

74.
75.

Id. at 63.
Id.
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best a hazy grasp of the epistemic norms to which we are committed,
“the religious” are unlikely to have any clearer a grasp of their epistemic
norms, and so it will be no easy thing for Leiter to show that the religious
adhere to the epistemic norm that he attributes to them.
As it turns out, Leiter offers no evidence that establishes any claim
about any epistemic norm to which so many are committed. A really nice
poll from Gallup might help, or an illuminating and clever experiment
from a famed social psychologist, or even an analysis of an appropriately
representative spread of theological tomes. Something that provides some
insight into the normative commitments of those included in the capacious
scope of Leiter’s insulation claim. We are given nothing of the sort. What
Leiter does offer is a brief reflection by a legal philosopher, Timothy
Macklem, on the relationship between faith and reason, in which Macklem
asserts that “faith exists as a form of rival to reason.”76 This is, to put it
mildly, a highly contested conception of the proper relation between faith
and reason. Even so, Leiter imputes that conception to religious folk
generally.77 This is manifestly inadequate and mildly ironic; Leiter’s
assessment of the consequentialist argument in favor of privileging
religion depends on a claim about insulation from evidence for which he
provides insufficient evidence.
Now this might seem like a really, really unfair niggle. After all, we
often draw conclusions, and reasonably so, about what lots of folks think
from anecdotal, but exemplary, evidence about what a few think. And
Leiter does something of this sort. That is, after he proposes his insulation
claim, Leiter considers several apparent counterexamples, concludes that
those counterexamples actually comport with his insulation claim, and
thereby provides evidence of a sort. But, as it turns out, the cases on
which he reflects show no such thing. Let me assess two.
Consider first Leiter’s discussion of belief in the resurrection of Christ.
Christians adhere to that belief on the basis of testimony contained in the
New Testament documents.78 Documentary testimony about events that
have occurred long ago is an entirely acceptable kind of evidence, both
in science and in common sense. So it seems that those who believe in
the resurrection do so on the basis of evidence of a perfectly legitimate
kind and thus seem to serve, at the very least, as exceptions to Leiter’s
insulation claim. But Leiter is unimpressed: Testimonial evidence that is
“inconsistent with all other scientific knowledge about how the world
works is nowhere thought to constitute good evidence for belief in a
76. Id. at 31 (quoting Timothy Macklem, Faith as a Secular Value, 45 MCGILL
L.J. 1, 33 (2000)).
77. See id. at 35.
78. See id. at 41.
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particular proposition, and that is exactly the status of the putative evidence
in support of the resurrection of Christ.”79 Given that there are “massive
amounts” of evidence—biological, physiological, and testimonial—that
weigh heavily against the rather thinly sourced ancient testimony contained
in the New Testament documents, it is plausible to suppose that those
“who still persist in believing in the resurrection of Christ hold that belief
insulated from reasons and evidence.”80 And, of course, if Christians
insulate their belief in the resurrection from scientific and commonsensical
scrutiny, then how much more likely will other religious beliefs be
insulated—beliefs for which there is nothing like the testimonial evidence
that supposedly grounds belief in the resurrection?
What should we make of Leiter’s analysis? Two points seem particularly
pertinent. First, suppose that it really is the case that a massive amount
of evidence undermines ancient testimony about the resurrection. This
assessment of the actual merits of the case for and against resurrection
claims has at best an uncertain bearing on the claim that religious believers
insulate some convictions from reasons and evidence, that is, they believe
that they ought to do so.81 For of course it is possible that Christians persist
in believing in the resurrection, not because they believe that they ought
to insulate that claim from scientific and commonsensical scrutiny but
because having scrutinized, they assess the relevant considerations
differently than does Leiter.
Many philosophers of religion dispute Leiter’s assessment of the
evidence for and against the resurrection, not because they are committed to
dismissing or discounting the “massive amounts” of relevant counterevidence
but because they deny that there exists such counterevidence. Perhaps
they are wrong to do so. Even so, it might be the differential assessment
of the relevant evidence that explains persistence in belief in the

79. Id.
80. Id. at 42. Leiter suspects that they do not give the right kind of weight to the
relevant evidence; too much to ancient testimony, too little to science: “To say that some
core beliefs in any religion are insulated from reason and evidence as understood in the
sciences is to make a claim not only about the kinds of evidence but about the kinds of
epistemic weight such evidence has in deciding what to believe.” Id. at 41.
81. Of course, Leiter might retreat from his considered understanding of the
insulation claim, namely, that it captures how religious folks believe that they ought to
govern their convictions. He might retreat to a claim about actual practice—that
religious folk do in fact withhold certain convictions from critical scrutiny and secular
folk do not. As I noted earlier, there is good reason why Leiter does not do so.
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resurrection rather than any believed obligation to insulate convictions
from scientific and commonsensical scrutiny.82
Second, there is a large popular and philosophical literature on the
rationality of belief in miracles like the resurrection.83 None of it, at
least none of which I am aware, defends the claim that belief in miracles
ought to be insulated from relevant evidence of any sort—scientific,
testimonial, commonsensical, or otherwise. Precisely the opposite.
Because scientific and commonsensical objections are taken seriously,
those who believe in the resurrection try to show that the relevant scientific
evidence does not have the implication that Leiter claims that it has. Were
such evidence against the resurrection merely to be discounted, why the
effort to show that it does not lead where Leiter claims that it does?
Why not just dismiss it as irrelevant, however massive the amount? Pretty
clearly, many of those who believe in the resurrection do not act and write,
as if they believe that they ought to insulate their belief in the resurrection
from Leiterian scrutiny.
Consider another bit of potential anecdotal evidence. Leiter discusses
a number of intellectualist religious traditions that might seem to count
as counterexamples to his insulation claim. He mentions the natural
theology of William Paley,84 the neo-Thomism of John Finnis,85 and the
reformed epistemology of William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas
Wolterstorff.86 Each of these traditions, in their own way, defends the
claim that religious belief can, and sometimes does, satisfy any and all
defensible standards of rationality. Such intellectualist traditions clearly
pose a threat to Leiter’s overall argument: If they correctly capture the
epistemic status of religious belief, then Leiter’s less than complimentary
construal must be significantly revised—with correspondingly deflating
implications for his overall argument against the state’s privileging
religion.87

82. More carefully put, differential assessment is at least as plausible an explanation of
persistent belief in the resurrection as is insulation from evidence.
83. For those who are interested in a philosophically and historically sophisticated
discussion, see generally C. STEPHEN EVANS, THE HISTORICAL CHRIST AND THE JESUS OF
FAITH: THE INCARNATIONAL NARRATIVE AS HISTORY (1996). For a more popular approach,
see generally C.S. LEWIS, MIRACLES: A PRELIMINARY STUDY (HarperCollins 2001) (1947).
84. LEITER, supra note 1, at 39.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 81.
87. Leiter seems to grant this in his assessment of John Finnis’s case for the claim
that religion deserves “appraisal respect”:
Finnis follows Thomas Aquinas in claiming that “the rationality norms which
guide us in all our fruitful thinking also, and integrally, summon us to affirm
the existence and providence of God.” These are astonishing claims, which, if
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But Leiter is not at all impressed. So, for example, he takes Alston,
Plantinga, and Wolterstorff’s defense of the rationality of religious belief
to be predicated on an “attack on ‘Enlightenment-approved evidence,’”
assumes that the whole program is “nothing more than an effort to insulate
religious faith from ordinary standards of reasons and evidence in common
sense and [the] sciences,” and thereby eases his way to the conclusion that
“religious belief is a culpable form of unwarranted belief given those
ordinary epistemic standards.” 88 Leiter’s assessment of reformed
epistemology comports with his take on intellectualist traditions generally:
[I]n the case of the sciences, beliefs based on evidence are also revisable in light
of the evidence; but in the intellectualist traditions in religious thought just
noted, it never turns out that the fundamental beliefs are revised in light of new
evidence. The whole exercise is one of post-hoc rationalization, as is no doubt
obvious to those outside the sectarian tradition. Religious beliefs are purportedly
supported by evidence, but they are still insulated from revision in light of
evidence.89

Leiter does not substantiate these claims with anything like a detailed
analysis of the relevant literature. Indeed, he is admirably forthright in
admitting that he merely assumes, without any accompanying argument,
that his negative assessment of reformed epistemology is correct. Now
we are all entitled to our assumptions, even controversial ones.
I help myself to more than a few in this paper. But our assumptions
must at least be consistent with the relevant evidence. And as I see it,
Leiter’s assumed assessment of reformed epistemology is belied both by
explicit statements of its most prominent advocates and by the underlying
logic of their overall project.
Consider in this regard a short monograph authored some forty years
ago by one of the founding members of reformed epistemology. Nicholas
Wolterstorff’s Reason Within the Bounds of Religion is a reflection on a
topic of direct relevance to Leiter’s insulation claim, namely, the role that
religious conviction ought to play in devising and evaluating scientific
they could be made good, would require a wholly different approach to the law
of religious liberty, as Finnis well appreciates.
Id. at 87 (quoting John Finnis, Does Free Exercise of Religion Deserve Constitutional
Mention?, 54 AM. J. JURIS. 41, 56 (2009)). As I understand them, Alston, Plantinga, and
Wolterstorff affirm Finnis’s basic claim—that belief in God comports with the “rationality
norms which guide us in all our fruitful thinking”—though I suspect they differ in their
understanding of what those rationality norms are.
88. LEITER, supra note 1, at 81.
89. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
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theories.90 In his book, Wolterstorff offers guidance to his fellow Christian
scholars as to how they ought to go about regulating their beliefs, both
scientific and religious. Its title might very well lead us to expect that its
author affirms a version of the epistemic norm that Leiter attributes to
religious folk generally. After all, if rational reflection ought to occur
within the bounds of religious conviction, then those religious boundaries
will constrain or control our rational reflections and thereby impede rational
reflection from undermining, or forcing us to revise, our religious
convictions. Unsurprisingly, Wolterstorff says things that sound somewhat
like that. So, for example, at the heart of his understanding of proper
belief-governance are the claims that each of us employ various “control
beliefs” governing our assessment of scientific data, that those control
beliefs rightly help us to determine which scientific theories to accept,
and that “the religious beliefs of the Christian scholar ought to function
as control beliefs within his devising and weighing of theories.”91
Wolterstorff is clear that when religious belief functions as control
belief, it might legitimately provide reason to reject a scientific theory
thought to be incompatible with authentic Christian commitment.92 That
sounds at least a little bit like the religious intellectual Wolterstorff does
in fact affirm the kind of epistemic norm that Leiter attributes to religious
believers.
But not really. Wolterstorff is a sophisticated philosopher and he
develops a nuanced understanding of the epistemic norms that apply to
religious belief. In the course of so doing, he rejects pretty much exactly
the insularity claim that Leiter imputes to religious folk generally. It is
worth citing Wolterstorff at some length:
Christians have been mistaken in what they thought constituted authentic
Christ-following; and sometimes they have become aware of their mistake
through developments in science. Though authentic commitment ought to
function as control within our theory-devising and theory-weighing, such activities
will forever bear within them the potential for inducing, and for justifiably
inducing, revisions in our views as to what constitutes authentic commitment,
and thus, revisions in our actual commitment.
....
The scholar never fully knows in advance where his line of thought will lead
him. For the Christian to undertake scholarship is to undertake a course of
action that may lead him into a painful process of revising his actual Christian
commitment, sorting through his beliefs, and discarding some from a position

90. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, REASON WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF RELIGION (2d ed.
1988). I have selected Wolterstorff’s book because it is, from among the many articles
and books published by reformed epistemologists, one that affirms something that at
least sounds like Leiter’s insulation claim.
91. Id. at 70.
92. Id. at 76.
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where they can any longer function as control. It may, indeed, even lead him to
a point where his authentic commitment has undergone change. We are all
profoundly historical creatures.93

This does not sound much like someone who believes that he, or his
fellow believers, ought to insulate even some religious convictions from
scientific and commonsensical scrutiny. The sensibility is exactly the
opposite; your religious convictions will play an important role in your
assessment of the many competing claims and arguments you will
encounter during your scholarly sojourn, and precisely because they play
that role, you must be prepared to alter them in light of your reflections.
Moreover, you cannot control how your religious convictions will be altered.
Anything and everything is potentially up for grabs. Whatever we might
think of Wolterstorff’s views, they do not license insularity from ordinary
standards of reasons and evidence.
It is not merely the case that advocates of reformed epistemology
explicitly reject Leiter’s insulation claim. The very logic of their position is
inconsistent with that claim. This is hardly the place to provide a systematic
articulation of their project, of course, so let me make only a few relevant
points.
First, reformed epistemologists uniformly reject the hegemonic modern
understanding of what makes for rational belief-formation, namely,
evidentialism, which is roughly the claim that in order for a given belief
to be justified, entitled, or warranted that belief must be grounded on
arguments or evidence of certain select sorts—self-evident intuitions, the
evidence of the senses, or the like. So, for example, according to
evidentialist conceptions of rationality, a theist’s belief that God exists
is rationally justified only if she has some appropriate argument in favor
of God’s existence—some version of the cosmological argument, a finetuning argument, or the like.
Second, Wolterstorff and his epistemological fellow travelers articulate
their own favored conceptions of what makes for rational belief-formation
and belief-governance. Plantinga developed an understanding of warrant,94
Alston developed an understanding of justification,95 and Wolterstorff

93. Id. at 95–97 (footnote omitted).
94. See generally ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANT: THE CURRENT DEBATE (1993);
ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANT AND PROPER FUNCTION (1993).
95. See generally WILLIAM P. ALSTON, EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION: ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (1989).
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developed an understanding of entitlement96 that each takes to be defensible
independently of its bearing on religion.
Third, each claims that some religious beliefs can be rational—or
justified, warranted, or entitled—absent any grounding argument. So,
for example, in Plantinga’s terminology, belief in God can be properly
basic, rationally believed without being grounded on anything like one
of the traditional arguments for God’s existence.97 In that respect, belief
in God is very much akin to all manner of other beliefs for which we can
provide no adequate and noncircular argument, say, that our senseperceptual faculties are reliable or that we ought not torture children just
for the fun of it.
Fourth, although religious beliefs need not have any evidential or
discursive grounding, Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and Alston are insistent that
any and all beliefs, including religious beliefs, must be consistent with
relevant, genuine evidence. Properly basic beliefs are presumed innocent
until they are proved guilty, can be proved guilty, and can be proved
guilty by scientific and commonsensical considerations.
Fifth, the fact that basic beliefs, like belief in God, are only innocent
until proven guilty explains why much of their work is dedicated to
assessing the multitudinous objections to religious belief. This is why,
for example, Plantinga has exhausted so many pages analyzing and
responding to the many different versions of the argument from evil
against God’s existence.98
I take it that even this cursory summary indicates that the basic claims
articulated by reformed epistemologists do not license insulating religious
claims from Leiterian scrutiny. There is no plausible interpretation of
their work according to which they say what Leiter says they say, namely,
that their effort is “predicated on an attack on ‘Enlightenment-approved
evidence.’”99 Reformed epistemology is predicated on an attack on

96. See generally NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Entitlement To Believe and Practices of
Inquiry, in 2 PRACTICES OF BELIEF: SELECTED ESSAYS 86 (Terence Cuneo ed., 2010).
97. See Alvin Plantinga, Reason and Belief in God, in FAITH AND RATIONALITY:
REASON AND BELIEF IN GOD 16 (Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds., 1983).
98. See ALVIN PLANTINGA, GOD, FREEDOM, AND EVIL 7–64 (William B. Eerdmans
Publ’g Co. 2002) (1974); ALVIN PLANTINGA, THE NATURE OF NECESSITY 164–95 (1978);
ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANTED CHRISTIAN BELIEF 459–99 (2000).
99. LEITER, supra note 1, at 81. Leiter relies for this formulation on an article by
Peter Forrest. But he does not seem to me to capture accurately Forrest’s explication of
reformed epistemology. As I read him, Forrest basically takes the line I do in this paper:
“As Plantinga develops it in his paper (1983), beliefs are warranted without
Enlightenment-approved evidence provided they are (a) grounded, and (b) defended
against known objections.” Peter Forrest, The Epistemology of Religion, S TAN .
E NCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-epistemology/#RefEpi
(last updated Apr. 24, 2013). What this means is not that Enlightenment-approved
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evidentialism, not evidence, whether approved by the Enlightenment or
by anything else.100 Its advocates deny that certain kinds of evidence are
required as the basis for belief in God, but they insist that belief in God
must not be defeated by any adequate consideration to the contrary. They
insist, moreover, that belief in God—what God is like and what God
does—should be revised in light of whatever considerations actually
warrant revision, as Wolterstorff insists in the passage cited earlier.
Scientific and commonsensical considerations paradigmatically exemplify
the kind of consideration that might require revision.
Of course, reformed epistemologists like Wolterstorff might say such
things in bad faith. They might say that they are willing to revise their
religious convictions in light of compelling scientific and commonsensical
considerations but be unwilling to do so. Leiter seems to insinuate this
at times: that what reformed epistemologists say they are doing—criticizing
a faulty, hegemonic conception of rationality—is not what is really going
on. For example, he claims “that ‘[R]eformed [E]pistemology’ is nothing

evidence is somehow or other illegitimate or of no good epistemic account but that
having such evidence is not a necessary condition of warranted belief. Moreover,
warranted beliefs that are not grounded on Enlightenment-approved evidence—properly
basic beliefs—must be defended against known objections, and some of those known
objections will utilize Enlightenment-approved evidence. In short, there is no plausible
interpretation of Plantinga’s work or the work of any other reformed epistemologist of
whom I am aware according to which anything they actually say is predicated on an
attack on Enlightenment-approved evidence. Now I suppose that Leiter could take the
line that being grounded on Enlightenment-approved evidence is a necessary condition
of rational belief-governance, that this requirement is one of the standards of reasons and
evidence at work in science and common sense and that religious belief does not even
aspire to satisfy that evidentialist standard. But this would require a very long and
complicated argument that Leiter does not even attempt to articulate. In my judgment,
there is excellent reason to be very skeptical of that move. The arguments articulated by
Alston, Plantinga, and Wolterstorff on that score are in my judgment compelling. Faith
always precedes discursive argument and the provision of Enlightenment-approved
evidence—for secular and religious alike. The most compelling articulations of this case, I
think, are WILLIAM P. A LSTON , P ERCEIVING G OD : T HE E PISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS
EXPERIENCE (1993) and WILLIAM P. ALSTON, THE RELIABILITY OF SENSE PERCEPTION
(1996). I should note that one prominent critic of the claim that the state may accord
religion privileged, beneficial treatment is able to accommodate this core claim about the
epistemology of religious and secular faith commitments. See RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION
WITHOUT GOD 17 (2013).
100. This is very clearly articulated by Nicholas Wolterstorff in his retrospective
account of the history and core commitments of reformed epistemology. See NICHOLAS
WOLTERSTORFF, Reformed Epistemology, in 2 PRACTICES OF BELIEF: SELECTED ESSAYS,
supra note 96, at 334.
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more than an effort to insulate religious faith” from appropriate criticism,
despite the many declarations to the contrary.101 So perhaps Leiter thinks
that we should impute to advocates of reformed epistemology claims that
run directly contrary to their explicit statements as well as to their substantive
arguments, and that we should do so because they are insincere, or selfdeceived, or something of the sort. Here, of course, I am more than willing
to rest my case. For this last move would be an act of dialectical desperation.
Leiter offers no better evidence for his claim that reformed epistemology
is really nothing more than an attempt to insulate religion than he does
for the original claim that insulation is characteristic of religion.102
Not only does Leiter fail to provide anything like adequate evidence
for his insulation claim and the cases on which he reflects fail to provide
even anecdotal evidence for that claim, Leiter’s insulation claim is also
belied by a surfeit of counterevidence. Here I will be short because the
counterevidence is so ample and easily accessible. It is abundantly clear
that religious folk have been led by scientific and commonsensical scrutiny
to revise and even to reject any number of religious claims. It used to be
the case, I speculate, that every theist believed that the earth was stationary
and that the sun revolved around the earth. This was apparently the clear
witness of the Bible and obvious to common sense. Now, I speculate
again, very few theists believe that. There is one and only one explanation
for that alteration of belief: the salutary impact of scientific scrutiny on
religious belief. Again, I speculate that some centuries ago, vast numbers of
religious folk believed, based on calculation from scriptural sources, that
human life on earth began some six thousand years ago. Now many believe
that human life began much earlier than that. There is one and only one
explanation for that alteration of belief: the salutary impact of scientific
scrutiny. I could go on, pretty much indefinitely, but there is no need. It
is obvious that religious folk have in fact altered their religious convictions
when they took there to be compelling scientific or commonsensical reason
to do so.
Now, of course, it could be the case that religious folk alter their religious
convictions under pressure from scientific and commonsensical scrutiny,

101. LEITER, supra note 1, at 81. Leiter makes a similar assertion with respect to
other intellectualist religious traditions: “[O]f course, [he says,] it is dubious (to the put
matter gently) that these positions are really serious about following the evidence where
it leads, as opposed to manipulating it to fit preordained ends.” Id. at 40. This is, of
course, a suspicion that we might direct at a good many philosophers, both secular and
religious.
102. Id. at 81. All we are given, so far as I can tell, is an appeal to what is
“uncontroversial[] among most philosophers” who are not also reformed epistemologists.
Id. This is not argument or philosophy, but sociology, and so can be safely dismissed as
irrelevant.
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but that they believe that they should not do so. Perhaps they are weak
of will and cannot resist the allurements of modern science. So perhaps
Leiter is correct; their practice to the contrary, religious folk believe that
they ought not alter their religious convictions in light of scientific and
commonsensical scrutiny. I leave it to the reader to decide whether or
not that is a credible claim and whether Leiter has provided adequate
evidence for that claim.
However that might be, I can afford to break off this line of argument
because Leiter readily grants that religious adherents sometimes subject
some of their convictions to scientific and commonsensical scrutiny. As
I noted above, Leiter’s considered understanding of his insulation claim
is that the religious believe that they ought not subject some of their
convictions to scientific and critical scrutiny. And so, he can easily grant
that the religious believe they may rely on science to revise their religiously
grounded beliefs about the relative movement of planetary bodies, and
so also their convictions about human origins. Even so, they are committed
to holding out on at least some other religious convictions. Which ones?
Leiter does not tell us—at least not in any detail. There are some, no
doubt they vary from religion to religion, and so it is likely not possible
to say much at all that is helpful in a general way about what those beliefs
are. At best, Leiter tells us, and only in passing, that religious folk insulate
their central,103 fundamental,104 or core beliefs from scientific and
commonsensical scrutiny.105
Now in order to assess this claim, we need to know what makes for a
core claim. Leiter does not tell us. One would think, though, that the
primary doctrinal claims of a given religion will serve.106 So, for example,
the claim that God exists—an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent
Creator—is arguably fundamental to many religious traditions. Given
this, the members of these traditions might be willing to revise their beliefs
about particular events attributed to God—the creation of Adam and Eve
or the creation of an immovable earth at the heart of the cosmos—and

103. LEITER, supra note 1, at 39.
104. Id. at 40.
105. Id. at 41.
106. There seem to me to be very different ways to understand what makes for a
core or fundamental belief. So, for example, a belief can be fundamental conceptually—
the belief that something exists is more fundamental than the belief that God exists—and
yet not be morally or motivationally fundamental—the belief that God exists might be
far more important morally and motivationally than the belief that something exists.
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yet, refuse to do so with respect to God’s existence and nature; God’s
omnipotence, impassibility, immutability, and so on. But once we formulate
Leiter’s position that way, we have excellent reason for skepticism.
Let me put the point biographically. I once had a friend, now deceased,
who was a theist of a rather traditional Anselmian sort. He became
interested in philosophy. He became particularly interested in the problem
of evil. He read his way through the literature and became more and
more skeptical of Anselmian conceptions of God. At the end of a long
process of reflection, he did not conclude that God does not exist. Nor
did he deny that God is good and loving. But he did conclude that God
could not be omnipotent. He continued to believe in God even when, much
later, he suffered a slow, lingering, and painful death. And as he suffered,
he continued to believe that God wanted to but could not help him, as
God lacked the power to do so. His conception of God altered, and it
altered under pressure from the so-called argument from evil, and the
argument from evil is about as commonsensical as one can get, given
that it relies on ordinary sense perceptual claims about human suffering
and familiar rules of logic. So, it seems to me that my friend’s belief in
God—his beliefs about what God is like, how God relates to the created
order, and how God related to him—altered under the impact of exactly
the sort of consideration from which religious folk are supposed by
Leiter to insulate their core beliefs. Moreover, he believed that his
understanding of God improved as a consequence of this alteration; he
did not think he had done anything wrong or impious. If this is not a
case of a religious person being willing to revise his core beliefs in light
of scientific and commonsensical scrutiny, if this is not a case of a
religious adherent embracing belief revision of core convictions as a
good in his life, then I am at a loss as to what would count as such.107
I could tell many more such stories. They are endlessly varied. I am
sure that any theist who works in philosophy nowadays can do so. You
can read many more such stories in the newspaper, on the Internet, and
in memoirs. For those of us who live those stories, Leiter’s construal of

107. Perhaps my friend had some other core belief that he thought he ought to
insulate from the appropriate kind of scrutiny? What would that core belief be? Is there
some specific set of doctrines, a different set for each religion, that ought not be subjected to
scientific and commonsensical scrutiny? Then I would like to know what that doctrinal
set is for the tradition I know best: which core set of beliefs are Christians supposed to
insulate? I would like to know because I am aware of no claim about God or God’s
nature that has not been subjected to searching criticism and revision in light of that
criticism. Is the claim that insulated core convictions differ from person to person? Or is
it something along the following lines: For each adherent of each religion, that adherent will
have some core religious belief or other that they believe they ought not subject to
commonsensical and scientific scrutiny. How could Leiter possibly know that?
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religion does not describe anything close to reality. His depiction of
religion is a fiction; there are plenty of religious folk for whom there are
no claims that they believe that they ought not be subject to appropriate
scrutiny—scientific, commonsensical, theological, or whatever.108 Of
course they need not relish the prospect of revising or abandoning those
beliefs. But then, who does? Very few people have acquired the peculiar
academic taste for revising or jettisoning their most important and dearly
held convictions. I judge that it is good that they lack that taste.
VII. AGAINST THE CONJUNCTION OF INSULARITY AND CATEGORICITY
As I see it, we have no good reason to believe, and very good reason
to reject, Leiter’s insulation claim. Suppose, however, that I am wrong
on both counts. Suppose, that is, that religious adherents believe that they
ought to insulate some of their religious convictions from Leiterian scrutiny.
Further problems remain. For Leiter helps himself to other claims that
are crucial to his rejection of the consequentialist argument and yet, for
which he fails to provide an adequate rationale. Here I will be brief.
As I noted above, the main consideration that Leiter weighs against
the consolatory benefits of religion are the harms, potential or actual,
that arise from the concatenation of insulation and categoricity. The
“combination of categorical demands on action and insulation from
evidence seems a frightening one” to Leiter.109 He is not very specific
about what seems frightening about that combination.110 But I suspect
108. Frankly, the claim that certain religious convictions ought not to be subject to
scientific and commonsensical scrutiny seems to me to be the kind of claim that is
concocted by intellectuals who are driven to extremity by perceived theoretical necessity.
I have in mind here the—now ancient—essay in which R. M. Hare develops the notion
of a “blik” in response to the critical assault on religion by logical positivists like the
eventual theist Antony Flew. R.M. Hare, Theology and Falsification: The University
Discussion, in NEW ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY 99–103 (Antony Flew &
Alasdair MacIntyre eds., The MacMillan Co. 1973) (1955).
109. LEITER, supra note 1, at 59.
110. I have to say that the combination of insularity and categoricity does not seem
to me frightening in the slightest. Not as such. In order for it to seem frightening, I
would need to know a great deal more about the beliefs that are insulated. After all, if
someone—call him Perkin—insulates his belief that God prohibits lethal violence even
in self-defense, I should not be frightened but put at ease. I might even regard Perkin’s
determined commitment to personal pacifism to be morally admirable and socially
beneficial, even if I also thought that he adhered to that belief only by violating some
epistemic duty to scrutinize with common sense. The concatenation of insularity and
categoricity should seem frightening only if the beliefs insulated are more likely than
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that his apprehension is to be explained by the fact that he assumes that
categoricity and insularity are related in very particular ways. I have in
mind the following passage:
[T]here is no apparent moral reason why states should carve out special
protections that encourage individuals to structure their lives around categorical
demands that are insulated from the standards of evidence and reasoning we
everywhere else expect to constitute constraints on judgments and action, even
allowing that those demands may figure in systems of belief that have some
utility-maximizing effects (e.g., existential consolation). Singling out religion
for toleration is tantamount to thinking we ought to encourage precisely this
conjunction of categorical fervor and its basis in epistemic indifference, and that
we should simply bite the speculative bullet.111

Here, we see that Leiter construes categoricity and insularity as bearing a
very particular—and prejudicial—relation to one another: “[C]ategorical
fervor” has “its basis in epistemic indifference.”112 And he appeals to the
conjunction of categoricity and insularity, so construed, as a consideration
that has decisive weight in his consequentialist assessment of the state’s
privileging religion. Thus, to privilege religion is to encourage categorical
fervor grounded in epistemic vice, but to encourage that is to encourage
very bad and potentially harmful behavior, and so we have excellent reason
not to privilege religion, even though we thereby forego certain consolatory
benefits.
But Leiter is not entitled to assume that any categorical beliefs are
insulated from evidence, much less that the former are somehow or other
grounded in the latter. Moreover, he provides insufficient reason to believe
that religion characteristically involves any such conjunction, much less
that it always does. Indeed, it seems to me that Leiter simply assumes that
categoricity and insulation are associated in very particular respects. But
what is wrong with that?
Note first that Leiter’s assumption is not implicit in, or otherwise implied
by, his tripartate construal of religion. Consider a homely example.
Suppose that I have ten bags of marbles. In each bag there are some green
marbles and some red marbles. From these facts, it does not follow that
any of my bags have marbles that are both green and red. It does not
follow that the green marbles bear any particular relation to the red marbles;
that a green marble lies atop, beside, or underneath a red one. It does not
follow that the presence of the green somehow explains the inclusion of
the red. It certainly does not follow that the green and red marbles produce

they would otherwise be to legitimize morally suspect or dangerous activity. Leiter does
not attempt to vindicate that empirical claim.
111. Id. at 63–64.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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marbles of any other color. Absent any additional reason to think that
marbles of particular colors are likely to relate to one another in particular
ways, all that follows is the conclusion that each bag contains some red
and some green marbles. The application to Leiter’s argument is direct:
from the facts that all religions include some beliefs about categorical
demands and that all religions include some beliefs that are insulated
from scientific and commonsensical scrutiny, it does not follow that
there are any categorical demands that are insulated from such scrutiny
or that the former bear any particular relation to the latter. Categoricity
and insularity need be related to one another no more determinately than
the red and green marbles.
Of course, Leiter’s association of insularity and categoricity would be
correct were it the case that all religious convictions are supposed to be
insulated from ordinary standards of reason and evidence.113 Given that
claim, and the claim that some religious convictions are about categorical
demands, it follows that some categorical demands are insulated from
Leiterian scrutiny. But it is not the case that religious folk think that they
ought to insulate all of their religious convictions from ordinary standards of
evidence and reason.114 Leiter knows that and explicitly rejects the stronger
false claim.115
But is it not just obvious that some categorical demands will, as a
matter of fact, be insulated by religious believers from scientific and
commonsensical scrutiny? No doubt there might be some here or there
for whom this is the case. For example, someone—call him Perkin—might
adhere to a strange theological system according to which God demands
that His followers support a flat tax, and he might simply refuse to consider
any alternatives, no matter how much evidence piles up that such a tax
policy would be morally and economically disastrous. God says it, that
settles it, and Perkin therefore will not consider even the slightest
progressivity. But I see no reason to believe that Perkin is characteristic
of religious believers, much less that all religions involve something akin
to Perkin’s fideistic commitment to confiscatory equality. And more
generally, I see no reason to believe that the conjunction of insulation and
categoricity is sufficiently characteristic of religion as to count significantly
in a consequentialist analysis of a policy of religious privilege.

113.
114.
115.

See id. at 34–35.
See id. at 34.
See id. at 35.
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The basis for my skepticism in this regard is perhaps best articulated
by recalling the preceding discussion of Leiter’s claim that the religious
believe that they ought not revise their core or fundamental convictions
in light of scientific or commonsensical scrutiny.116 Suppose that Leiter
is correct: religious folk are willing to scrutinize convictions at the periphery
of their faith, but they will not do so regarding at least some of their core
commitments.117 What reason do we have to surmise that those core, and so
insulated, commitments are related in any particular way to religiously
grounded demands? None that I can espy.
So, for example, suppose that Perkin has two fundamental religious
beliefs: that God exists and that God has, in some way or other, authored
the Bible. He also has a buzzing, blooming confusion of additional
religious convictions, none of which, let us suppose, can be true unless
God exists and very many of which are grounded in his interpretation of
the Bible. Suppose that none of these additional beliefs function as a
core religious belief for Perkin: that God exists and that God has
authored the Bible are central, meaning-giving, fundamental convictions
for Perkin, and these two core claims are surrounded by an indefinitely
large and coruscating periphery of additional beliefs—that God is the
creator of every contingently existing thing, that the flat tax is Biblical
policy, that the nuclear family is part of God’s design plan for humanity,
that Jesus had twelve disciples, and on and on. Many, though not all, of
these additional, peripheral beliefs are about what God demands.
Stipulate, for purposes of argument, that Perkin is unwilling to subject
his two core convictions to Leiterian scrutiny. Perkin just cannot bring
himself to consider seriously the possibility that science disproves the
existence of God or the divine authorship of the Bible. What, however,
of the epistemic stance Perkin takes up with respect to his multitudinous
peripheral beliefs—a periphery, to remind, that includes all of his beliefs
about God’s commands? So far as I can tell, there is nothing internal to
Leiter’s understanding of insularity or categoricity, nor is there anything
about the relation between core and peripheral beliefs that provides reason
to conclude that Perkin must believe that one, some, or all of those
additional, peripheral beliefs ought to be insulated from commonsensical

116. It is unclear to me whether or not Leiter thinks that all core or fundamental
religious convictions are supposed to be insulated from commonsensical and scientific
scrutiny. Compare id. at 40–41, with id. at 46–47. I will assume in what follows that
only the weaker formulation captures Leiter’s intent: that religious folk believe that they
ought to insulate only some of their core religious convictions. This makes the assessment of
his position more complicated but the position itself more plausible.
117. See id. at 40–42.
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and scientific scrutiny.118 Moreover, and more importantly, Perkin might
well have excellent religious reasons to subject those additional, noncore
beliefs to Leiterian scrutiny. How so?
Suppose that Perkin affirms the following propositional package: that
friendship with God is the greatest good to which he can aspire, that
friendship with God requires a sincere willingness on his part to comply
with God’s demands, that a sincere willingness to comply with God’s
demands requires him to do his best to determine what God’s demands
really are, that doing his best to determine what God actually demands
requires recourse to any and every available normatively relevant
consideration, and that among the relevant kinds of considerations are
scientific and commonsensical considerations. Should he assent to each
of those propositions—and a great many religious folk will—then he has
a particularly powerful reason to subject his beliefs about what God demands
to the most searching scientific, commonsensical scrutiny consistent with
fulfilling his other duties.119 What he will not do—what he has compelling
religious reason to refrain from doing—is to insulate his understanding
of what God demands from any consideration that might provide insight
into what God actually requires of him. In short, even if Perkin insulates
some of his core beliefs from Leiterian scrutiny, he might well take himself
to have a religious duty to scour away at his religious demands with a hard
scientific and commonsensical brush.
Might it be the case that some of Perkin’s beliefs about God’s demands
are located at the core of his faith? I see no reason to believe that this
must be the case. But even if some of Perkin’s beliefs about God’s
demands are located in his noetic core, is it not most likely that those
demands will be very general—“Do good and forsake evil” or “Do unto
others”—rather than “Support the flat tax?” And if Perkin’s core beliefs
include general demands, then those demands will have to be applied to
particular circumstances before they can rationalize harmful actions and
policies. But then Perkin will have compelling reason to subject those
applications to Leiterian scrutiny. There is a very great distance between
“Do unto others” and “Support the flat tax.” Scientific and commonsensical
scrutiny will surely play a crucial role in moving Perkin from the first to
the second, and, plausibly, this interposition of Leiterian scrutiny will

118. Leiter is mostly silent about the relation between core and peripheral beliefs.
See id. at 46–47.
119. See EBERLE, supra note 25, at 328–29.
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help to prevent whatever harms potentially result from the insulation of
categorical demands.120
How is all of this relevant to Leiter’s argument? Even if we grant
Leiter’s insulation claim, we lack reason to conclude that belief in religious
demands are the outflow of, or in any way connected to, epistemic
indifference or insularity. But the supposed conjunction of categoricity
and insularity is Leiter’s primary reason for rejecting the consequentialist
argument in favor of religious privilege: most of the negative consequences
that Leiter weighs in the balance against the goods generated by the
consolatory function of religion depend in some way on his conjoining
insulation to categoricity.121 The demise of that conjunctive claim means
that his defense against the consequentialist argument fails.
VIII. A REVISED CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENT FOR RELIGIOUS
ACCOMMODATION
Suppose that this last conclusion is correct. What follows? Well, then
it seems that an appropriately revised version of Leiter’s argument supports
the conclusion that he sets out to deny. When we excise from Leiter’s
assessment of the consequentialist argument for religious privilege any
and all claims about insulation from ordinary standards of reasons and
evidence, indeed, when we recognize that religious folk are free to adhere to
standards of rationality no different than those applicable to anyone else,
then the resulting argument counts in favor of the state’s providing religion
with privileged, beneficial treatment.122 Stripped to its bare essentials,
this revised consequentialist argument is that the state should accord
privileged, beneficial treatment to religion because doing so has sufficiently
extensive consolatory benefits—meaning, comfort, and moral orientation—
in the face of death and suffering.123 That is, the categoricity of religious
demands remains a wash and the insulation of religious demands from
appropriate scrutiny is a fiction, and so they do not factor into the calculation
at all and what remains on the balance sheet is a net improvement by virtue
of the distinctive capacity of religion to console human beings in the face of
the death and suffering to which we are all vulnerable.124 To accord religion
privileged, beneficial treatment is, all things considered, good for human
beings, good for society, and hence, eminently sensible state policy.
120. See LEITER, supra note 1, at 60–61.
121. So also, I should add, does Leiter’s main objection to other arguments in the
vicinity, most particularly the argument that we should accord religion special treatment
by virtue of the fact that religion deserves “appraisal respect.” See id. at 70–71.
122. See id. at 34.
123. See id. at 52.
124. See id. at 51–52.
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I hasten to add that this revised consequentialist argument depends on
Leiter’s original construction, on his correctly identifying the relevant
goods and bads generated by the state’s privileging religion, on his
estimate of the normative weight of those goods and bads, and so forth.125
Even if we allow for the fact that Leiter’s estimates are gross and that the
categories he employs to make those estimates incorporate many distinct
kinds of goods and bads, it seems to me that his argument is not without
merit. After all, such gross judgments and hazy comparisons are absolutely
normal in political discourse. If the revised argument is too simplistic,
then so are many, many other arguments about public policies about which
we must reach some resolution and for which we have little else to offer
but vague consequentialist calculations.
IX. A REVISED AND AMPLIFIED CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENT FOR
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
Even so, it seems to me that the revised consequentialist argument is
pretty thin gruel. Fortunately, it can be strengthened when we add to our
assessment a number of factors that Leiter overlooks. I will mention two,
not because they are the only additional factors but because they help to
address specific concerns raised by Leiter.126
First, when the state uses its coercive power to force citizens to violate
their religious demands, the state imposes distinctively great costs on
those citizens.127 As I noted above, familiar theistic traditions take moral
requirements to have not only overriding but also overwhelming normative
weight: compliance with moral requirements is necessary to friendship
with God, violation of moral requirements is tantamount to betraying God,
friendship with God is the greatest good to which a human being can
aspire, and betrayal of God is the greatest evil that can befall a human
being. A theist who sincerely believes this way will take himself to have
overwhelmingly powerful reason to comply with what he sincerely takes
to be his moral requirements.128 Other things equal, a theist who believes

125. See id. at 66–67.
126. I should note that the two additional considerations I discuss in this section
correlate with the two “friendly amendments” I earlier offered to Leiter’s conception of
religion. See supra Part IV.
127. This claim is implicitly incompatible with the parity claim at the heart of
Leiter’s private space argument that I discussed at the outset. See supra Part I.
128. See EBERLE, supra note 25, at 146–47.
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this way will take himself to have greater reason—much greater—to
comply with his moral requirements than he would have were he no longer
to believe that way.129 If Perkin believes that he is morally required to
support the flat tax, and he also believes that violating a moral requirement
betrays God, then he will take himself to have greater overall reason to
support the flat tax than he would have were he to believe only that he is
morally required to support the flat tax. The sum of any number plus
something must be greater than that number alone. Perkin’s theism here
exemplifies a more general phenomenon, one that I associate with religion
generally: normative amplification. That is, religions of varied sorts
associate ordinary moral consideration with various extraordinary and
weighty reasons for action. In so doing, they provide their adherents with
powerful additional reason to comply with those requirements.130 Theistic
traditions of various sorts provide paradigmatic examples of normative
amplification, as do certain kinds of Buddhism I believe.131
Now I assume that there is a rough—perhaps very rough—correlation
between believed normative weight and subjective urgency. Other things
equal, the greater the normative weight of the reasons that we sincerely
believe count in favor of some course of action, the more it will matter

129. See id. at 323.
130. See LEITER, supra note 1, at 41. As I see it, normative amplification of this
sort is constitutive of the religious. If this excludes certain religions, then so be it. We
all have to make our cuts. I am quite confident that there is no characterization of religion that
covers everything that everyone thinks is religious. Similarly, of course, for many other
contested concepts such as evidence, necessity, justification, rationality, and on and on.
131. I am by no means an expert—I am barely passingly familiar with Buddhism—
but from what I have read, it seems to me that karmic considerations serve the same
amplifying function for Buddhists that friendship with God does for theists. It is just part
of the moral order that present acts have consequences in future lives and that the moral
quality of those acts influence what those future consequences will be.
As regards the fruits of actions in a future human life: mercilessly killing and
injuring living beings leads to being short-lived; . . . being jealous and spiteful
leads to being of no account; being stingy leads to being poor; being haughty
and disrespectful leads to being of a lowly family; and not asking about what is
morally wholesome and unwholesome leads to being weak in wisdom. The
opposite good actions lead to a heavenly rebirth or the opposite kinds of
human life.
....
The law of karma is seen as a natural law inherent in the nature of things,
like a law of physics. It is not operated by a God, and indeed the gods are
themselves under its sway. Good and bad rebirths are not, therefore, seen as
‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’, but as simply the natural results of certain kinds
of action.
PETER HARVEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHIST ETHICS 16 (2000) (footnote omitted).
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to us that we follow that course of action.132 Again, other things equal,
the greater the normative weight of the reasons that we sincerely believe
to count against some course of action, the greater our aversion to pursuing
that course of action. If this is the case, then, plausibly, religious citizens
who are forced by the state to violate what they take to be a moral
requirement will, other things equal, undergo greater suffering, alienation,
and frustration than they would were they to lack any comparable religious
belief. Crudely put: someone who takes herself to be morally prohibited
from “X-ing” and who also believes that X-ing betrays God, will, other
things equal, be more alienated, frustrated, and angered when forced by
the state to X than she would be were she to have exactly the same moral
convictions about X-ing but not believe that X-ing betrays God.133 Given
that for a theist betraying God is the worst thing that can befall a human
being, she will likely be very much more alienated in the first condition
than she will in the second.
I take it that the distinctive bads engendered when the state forces
religious folk to violate what they take to be their moral requirements are
relevant to any consequentialist assessment of the state’s according
privileged, beneficial treatment to religion. Moreover, it seems to me to
be a very weighty consideration: the alienation engendered in sincere
believers by the prospect of betraying God is so great that we have powerful
reason to do whatever we feasibly and permissibly can to accommodate
them.134 Similarly, of course, with respect to the alienation engendered in
those nontheists for whom the violation of moral obligation holds out the
prospect of being reincarnated as a lesser animal. Similarly for other
132. This seems to be the case with respect to distinct moral considerations. So,
for example, if Perkin sincerely believes that he is morally required not to eat fish on
Friday, and if he sincerely believes that it is morally good but supererogatory for him to
fast on Thursday, then, other things equal, Perkin will likely care more about eating fish
on Friday than he does about fasting on Thursday. This is because moral obligations
have greater normative weight than mere goods, and what matters to a decently socialized,
properly functioning human being like Perkin is proportioned to the normative weight of
the reasons that apply to them. This is armchair psychology, I realize. Every once in a
while, though, armchair psychology is correct, and I hope that it is in this case. That
said, human beings have extremely complicated and unpredictable subjective responses
to normative reasons, and there is little doubt that there are many—perhaps all of us on
some occasions—for whom the posited correlation between believed normative weight
and subjective mattering come apart. For some, I suppose, there is a systematic disconnect;
those popularly referred to as sociopathic. See EBERLE, supra note 25, at 168–69.
133. See id. at 168–69.
134. See id. at 323.
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religions. If this is correct, then we can articulate a revised and amplified
consequentialist argument in favor of privileging religion. For the state
to accord religion privileged, beneficial treatment—by granting religious
objectors exemptions from otherwise justified laws—is for the state to
promote religion, and for the state to promote religion in that way is for
the state to help to bring about important consolatory benefits as well as
to prevent considerable alienation, frustration, and anger among its citizenry.
Plausibly, the consolatory goods achieved and the alienation avoided
outweigh any negative costs engendered thereby. Consequently, there is
excellent consequentialist reason for the state to privilege religion by
accommodating religious objectors.
There are further considerations relevant to our revised and amplified
consequentialist argument that are not included in Leiter’s initial
formulation. I want to mention one more, one that helps to address a moral
objection that Leiter lodges against religious accommodation. If the
state promotes religion by according it privileged, beneficial legal status,
then the state thereby promotes a wide diversity of socially beneficial
goods. This is because religiosity is, apparently, correlated with an
astonishingly wide range of really terrific things. Here I rely on a recent
compendium of sociological literature by Rodney Stark, who consolidates a
wide range of empirical research in support of that claim.135 So, to take
a few of Stark’s examples, religious Americans are much less likely to
commit crimes than the irreligious;136 weekly church attenders are much
more likely to do volunteer work than nonattenders;137 weekly church
attenders are more likely to donate to a secular charity than nonattenders;138
religious Americans greatly outlive nonreligious Americans;139 and religious
135. RODNEY STARK, AMERICA’S BLESSINGS: HOW RELIGION BENEFITS EVERYONE,
INCLUDING ATHEISTS (2012); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL WITH
SHAYLYN ROMNEY GARRETT, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US
443–93 (2010).
136. STARK, supra note 135, at 55.
137. Id. at 120.
138. Id. at 117–18 (“All respondents were asked whether they had given money to
a charity in the past year. Seventy-eight percent of Americans said, ‘Yes.’ Eighty percent of
Protestants and Catholics said they had done so, as did 96 percent of the Jews . . . but
only 66 percent of those saying they had no religion gave money to a charity in the past
year. As for the effect of church attendance, 87 percent of the weekly attenders, 80
percent of those who attend less often, and only 60 percent of the nonattenders said they
had donated. The effects of church attendance hold up among both men and women,
whites and African Americans.”).
139. Id. at 106–07 (“[M]any careful studies have all found that modern Americans
who attend church weekly greatly outlive those who never attend. The best national
study suggests that attenders have an average of 7.6 years of greater life expectancy at
age 20 than do nonattenders. Most of this difference in life expectancy remains even after
removal of the religion-related effects of ‘clean living.’” (footnote omitted)).
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Americans are more likely to get married and stay married than are the
irreligious.140 Stark offers evidence for many more such social benefits,
including blood donation, fertility, performance on standardized tests,
graduation from high school, skepticism about paranormal phenomena
such as Bigfoot, UFOs and ghosts, and on and on.141 He even tries to
quantify the results in a final, culminating, monetary aggregation: “American
religion . . . provides a great many tangible benefits to all of us[,] having
an annual cash value of more than $2.6 trillion,” and this does not include
the many intangible benefits of religion.142
Now I have to say that I do not have the expertise to assess these claims.
Stark is clear that the data are contested, which is hardly a surprise. My
point in referring to his work is that there is a credible empirical case to
be made in favor of the claim that promoting religion has a very wide
diversity of socially beneficial consequences, that it is therefore reasonable
to believe that promoting religion has those kinds of socially beneficial
consequences, that those benefits are relevant to any consequentialist
assessment of the state’s according religion a privileged legal status, and
that, if Stark is actually correct, then they count significantly in favor of
the state’s doing so.
One implication of Stark’s work is that it provides a basis for
responding to one of Leiter’s main concerns with a subclass of religious
accommodations, that is, those exemptions that shift burdens, or the risk
thereof, to others not so exempted. Leiter claims that this is unfair;
accommodating religious objectors is inequitable when excepting believers
from a given law makes those who must follow the law worse off.143
But Stark’s work provides reason for pause. If accommodating religion
promotes religion, and religiosity has the kinds of effects that Stark
enumerates, then it is plausible to suppose that accommodating religion
has beneficial consequences even for those to whom accommodation is
not extended. Concretely put, if religion is really terrifically effective in
preventing crime and reducing recidivism, and if this means that there
140. Id. at 64 (“[A]mong adults ages 30 to 45—the prime marriage years—people
who never attend church are twice as likely as the weekly attenders to have never married or
to currently be divorced or separated.” (footnote omitted)).
141. For a summary of results, see id. at 4–5.
142. Id. at 168.
143. See LEITER, supra note 1, at 100. Actually, Leiter articulates this “Rousseauian”
objection to burden-shifting exemptions generally, not merely to burden-shifting
religious exemptions. Id. at 100–01. But if it applies to all burden-shifting exemptions,
then it applies to the religious ones as well, which is sufficient for my purposes. Id.
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are fewer criminals on the streets, then it is plausible to suppose that the
state’s promoting religion helps to protect everyone from crime. Less
crime means less crime for everyone—secular and religious alike.144
Similarly for blood donation, increased fertility, graduation from high
school, and so on. In short, although not everyone enjoys the benefits of
each particular religious exemption, everyone benefits from the general
policy of the state’s granting religious exemptions. And, of course, the
revised and amplified consequentialist argument under consideration is
supposed to provide a credible rationale for a general policy of religious
accommodation.
The revised, and now amplified, consequentialist argument is obviously
not a demonstration such that it should persuade each moral and epistemic
peer. It depends on any number of contestable claims: that the consolatory
benefits of religion count in favor of privileging religion, that insularity
is not a characteristic or defining feature of religion, that sincere belief
about normative weight roughly correlates with subjective urgency, that
the religious are less likely to commit crimes than the irreligious, and so on.
Epistemically competent and morally serious people can, and no doubt will,
dispute such claims. I take it that this is par for the course for consequentialist
arguments about significant public policies. That is, reasonable disagreement
regarding consequentialist arguments is entirely normal, expected, and
legitimate in political argument. It will bedevil the revised and amplified
argument for religious privilege, just as it no doubt bedevils other
consequentialist arguments, such as Leiter’s private space argument.
But it is a credible argument, one such that it is worth taking seriously by
our moral and epistemic peers. That is, it is “a credible principled
argument . . . that . . . explain[s] why . . . we ought to accord special legal
and moral treatment to religious practices.”145

144. See generally BYRON R. JOHNSON, MORE GOD, LESS CRIME: WHY FAITH MATTERS
AND HOW IT COULD MATTER MORE (2011).
145. LEITER, supra note 1, at 7. Suppose that my consequentialist argument is
inconclusive in the respect that the goods and bads engendered by a general policy of
accommodating religion roughly balance out. Then, plausibly, that argument vindicates
the claim that the state may accord religion special, beneficial treatment but not the claim
that the state ought to do so. As I understand it, a consequentialist conception of morality
mandates policies and practices that maximize net happiness—or whatever the relevant
axiological considerations happen to be—permits policies the relevant consequences of
which balance out and prohibits the remaining nonmaximizing alternatives.
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X. A REVISED AND RELIGIOUSLY AMPLIFIED CONSEQUENTIALIST
ARGUMENT FOR RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
The revised and amplified consequentialist argument is a credible secular
argument for religious accommodation.146 I believe that it is a good and
terrific thing that there is such a secular argument. It is a good thing not
merely pragmatically but also morally. Religious citizens in liberal polities
have a moral duty to do their best to articulate reasons for their favored
policies that persuade their compatriots, and so their secular compatriots.
Thus, they have a moral duty to do their best to articulate persuasive secular
reasons for their favored policies. They need not regard those secular
reasons as sound, of course, and they may support policies for which there
are no persuasive secular reasons. Nevertheless, they ought to try to
articulate them.147 Note, however, that this obligation does not apply
only to religious citizens. Secular citizens are no less obligated to try to
articulate reasons persuasive to their religious compatriots than the reverse.148
Given that the revised and amplified consequentialist argument will be
utterly unpersuasive to some religious citizens, how might we fulfill our
obligation to persuade them?149
We could, of course, articulate a different—perhaps nonconsequentialist
—secular argument for religious accommodation. Frankly, I have no
idea how such a nonconsequentialist argument would go. We could also

146. I mean by a secular argument one the conclusion of which does not decisively
depend on any claims about the existence of God, the afterlife, or any other supernatural
realities. So, for example, although the revised and amplified consequentialist argument
for religious accommodation depends on claims about the salutary societal effects of
religious practice or the negative psychological consequences of violating believed
religious norms, it does not depend on the claim that God exists, that human beings will
be reincarnated in some future existence, or anything of the sort.
147. On this supposed obligation, see EBERLE, supra note 25, at 323. I hope that I
have discharged that obligation by articulating the revised and amplified consequentialist
argument for religious accommodation.
148. See Christopher J. Eberle, Religious Reasons in Public: Let a Thousand
Flowers Bloom, But Be Prepared To Prune, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431, 441
(2007). Of course, neither of the duties to persuade that I mention in the text are legal
duties. They are moral duties attached to the social role of citizen in a liberal polity.
149. I am assuming here that to provide a religious believer with a secular rationale
such as the revised and amplified consequentialist argument is not to thereby provide any
reason that does, might, or should persuade the believer. Pretty clearly, a religious
believer might have excellent reason, as rationally judged by that believer, to reject what
is in fact an objectively sound secular rationale—as I believe the revised and amplified
consequentialist argument to be.
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articulate a religious argument for religious accommodation. There are
many such candidates. Various theorists, past and present, have appealed to
the unpredictability of divine action, a paramount duty to obey God, or
some distinctive feature of religious faith as a basis for concluding that
the state ought to accord religious dissenters privileged, beneficial
treatment.150 Given the prominence of such religious arguments, and
given that, I suspect, many citizens in the United States are led by religious
reasons to believe that the state ought to accommodate religious objectors, it
seems important to say something about the role that religious reasons
might play in vindicating religious accommodation. Unfortunately, doing
so systematically would send us on a very long detour; one that I decline
to take. Consequently, I will briefly suggest how certain religious
considerations might help to augment the secular argument that I have
already articulated.
Let me begin by returning briefly to Leiter’s argument. As I noted
above, Leiter claims that “absent an antecedent bias in favor of religion”
there is no reason to conclude that the relevant consequentialist considerations
actually tally in favor of a policy of religious accommodation.151 Now
bias is persuasive language. To my ears, it is bad to be biased. Better—
more evenhanded—is the rather antiseptic language of antecedent
commitment: unless we bring to our assessment of his argument the
belief that religion is wonderfully terrific, life-enhancing, or something
of the sort, then we have, says Leiter, no reason to believe that the relevant
consequentialist considerations vindicate religious accommodation.152
Suppose that he is correct about that. Well, then, what is so bad about
being antecedently committed? After all, it is a truism in contemporary
philosophy that precommitments of various sorts inevitably shape our
normative reflections. Plausibly, that truism applies to the particular topic at
hand. There is no theoretically or normatively neutral way either to identify

150. I have found the following helpful: THOMAS S. KIDD, GOD OF LIBERTY: A
RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2010); NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF,
A Religious Argument for the Civil Right to Freedom on Religious Exercise, Drawn from
American History, in UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 329 (Terence Cuneo ed., 2012); NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, THE MIGHTY
AND THE ALMIGHTY: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL THEOLOGY (2012). It would perhaps be
best to articulate a number of religious arguments relying on different premises drawn
from distinct religious traditions.
151. LEITER, supra note 1, at 63. As the reader will recall, Leiter claims that absent
bias in favor of religion there is no compelling reason to conclude that “the existential
consolation functions of religion produce more utility than the harm produced by the
conjunction of categoricity and insulation [from] evidence.” Id.
152. What I mean by a precommitment is pretty much what Wolterstorff means by
a control belief, as I briefly articulated above. See supra text accompanying notes 91–
92.
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the considerations that are relevant to a consequentialist assessment of the
policy of religious accommodation or to assess the relative weight of the
relevant considerations once they have been identified. In short, no one
can, or ought to, assess consequentialist arguments of the sort
articulated by Leiter absent various antecedently held and broadly
applicable commitments about human nature, religion, proper human
functioning, epistemic vice, the common good, and the like. This is, of
course, exactly what Leiter does. Absent a bias in favor of scientific and
commonsensical criticism, not to mention a bias against insularity, it is hard
to see how Leiter’s case against accommodating religion could even get off
the ground.
Not only must, and so may, we assess Leiter’s consequentialist argument
for religious accommodation by relying on some precommitments, we
may also do so by relying on relevant religious precommitments.153 For
reasons articulated some forty years ago by Nicholas Wolterstorff in
Reason Within the Bounds of Religion and by many other theorists since
then, religious adherents have every epistemic right to rely on their religious
convictions when they assess the kind of claims that bear on a
consequentialist assessment of religious accommodation.154 Precommitment
there will be; religious precommitment there may be; and some of those
religious precommitments will be pro-religious. Plausibly, those proreligious biases will powerfully shape our assessment of the
consequentialist argument for religious accommodation. How so? It is
hard to be both clear and general, so I will again put the point in theistic
terms.
Many theists believe that human beings have been created by God,
that we are created for friendship with God, that we can fully flourish
only when we strive to befriend God, and that our deepest aspirations
cannot therefore be fully satisfied by ordinary human goods. In brief,
many theists believe that God has designed human beings in such a way
that we can fully flourish only when we are related in appropriate ways
153. We may also do so by relying on our antireligious precommitments—perhaps
Freudian, Feuerbachian, or Marxist claims about the psychological or social (dys)functions of
the religious. Presumably, those who assess the consequentialist argument in light of
such antecedent biases will reach a very different result that I do.
154. Of course, Wolterstorff has continued to make that case, and with ever
increasing sophistication, in the ensuing forty years. See, e.g., NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JOHN
LOCKE AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 82–83 (1996); WOLTERSTORFF, supra note 90, at 98–
100; NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, THOMAS REID AND THE STORY OF EPISTEMOLOGY 256–60
(2001).
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to God. This is a very familiar theistic understanding of human nature
and human well-being. It was, for example, famously expressed at the
outset of Saint Augustine’s Confessions:
Great are you, O Lord, and exceedingly worthy of praise; your power is
immense, and your wisdom beyond reckoning. And so we humans, who are a
due part of your creation, long to praise you—we who carry our mortality about
with us, carry the evidence of our sin and with it the proof that you thwart the
proud. Yet these humans, due part of your creation as they are, still do long to
praise you. You arouse us so that praising you may bring us joy, because you
have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart is unquiet until it rests in
you.155

Now suppose that we adhere to this Augustinian conception of human
nature and well-being. Suppose that we are epistemically entitled to do
so. And suppose that we bring that conception to bear on our analysis of
the consequentialist case for religious accommodation. That is, our
theologically grounded understanding of human nature and well-being
does not lie inert in some nether region of our noetic structure but shapes
our reflections on what I take to be the central question raised by Leiter’s
discussion of the consequentialist argument, that is, whether or not the
state’s promoting religion by way of accommodating religious objectors
is a good thing, overall and in the long run, for human beings and human
society.
How might that Augustinian conception of human well-being help to
answer that question? In two importantly distinct ways, at least. First, if
Augustine’s conception is correct, friendship with God is a crucial component
of human well-being. It is not good intrinsically or in the abstract but
good for those who actually befriend God. If the state’s accommodating
religious objectors does in fact promote friendship with God, and if
friendship with God is a central component of human well-being—as it
is on this Augustinian conception—then the state’s accommodating
religious objectors will thereby promote a central component of human
well-being.156 I take it that the implications of this conclusion for a
155. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS 39 (John E. Rotelle ed., Maria Boulding
trans., New City Press 1997) (1990) (footnotes omitted).
156. I take there to be no insuperable moral impediment to the state’s promoting
religion any more than there is to the state’s promoting art, or tolerance, or altruism, or
patriotism. Of course, from the fact that the state may promote religion by way of
exempting religious objectors, it hardly follows that the state may promote religion in
just any other way. So, for example, I deny that the state may promote religion by paying the
salaries of clergy or by persecuting religious skeptics. The first has proven to be disastrous for
religion, stultifying its production of socially beneficial goods, not to mention friendship with
God. The second violates very important rights. Promoting religion by exempting religious
objectors suffers from neither of those defects. No one has a right that the state refrain
from promoting religion in any and all respects.
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consequentialist assessment of religious accommodation are sufficiently
apparent that they need not be spelled out.
Second, the state’s promoting religion by accommodating religious
objectors produces an indefinitely wide and varied number of secondary
and tertiary goods: altruism, generosity, repentance, courage and solace
in the face of death and suffering, and so on. The existence and extent of
such goods are indicated by the aforementioned bits of scientific and
commonsensical evidence, such as the survey results marshaled by Stark,
the testimonials about the comforts of religion, and so on. But those who
adhere to the Augustinian conception of human nature and flourishing
will reasonably believe that those bits of evidence do not fully capture
the reality for which they provide some evidential indication; if God has
created human beings so that they flourish when they strive to befriend
God, then the benefits, social and personal, engendered by religious
practice will be far more extensive than those verified by the genuinely
helpful but limited tools of survey research. In short, someone who assesses
the consequentialist argument for religious accommodation from the
perspective provided by the Augustinian conception of human flourishing
will reasonably believe that accommodating religion achieves many goods
undetected by science and commonsense and may rationally conclude
that the consequentialist case for religious accommodation is very strong
indeed.
Of course, many citizens and public officials in a pluralistic liberal
polity such as the United States will find the Augustinian conception of
human nature and well-being that I have just sketched incredible. As a
consequence, they will not be persuaded by this religiously amplified
consequentialist argument. That fact, undoubted as it is, is not particularly
relevant to my discussion. For the religiously amplified argument is not
supposed to persuade them. Nor must it persuade them. It is not important,
much less necessary, that there exist one, canonical, or widely shared
rationale for the policy of religious accommodation. It is sufficient, even
for some card-carrying public reason liberals, that each citizen have
reasons that convince them.157 And for secular citizens there is, I submit,
157. Gerald F. Gaus, The Place of Religious Belief in Public Reason Liberalism, in
MULTICULTURALISM AND MORAL CONFLICT 19, 25–26 (Maria Dimova-Cookson & Peter
M.R. Stirk eds., 2010); Gerald F. Gaus & Kevin Vallier, The Roles of Religious
Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry
and Political Institutions, 35 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 51, 58–59 (2009). As I understand
Gaus and Vallier, roughly, each citizen must have reasons that persuade them to support
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the revised and amplified consequentialist argument for religious
accommodation.
More relevant is the fact that the vast majority of citizens and public
officials in the United States are, and will for the foreseeable future remain,
religiously committed. They might very well find the Augustinian conception
of human nature and flourishing persuasive—or perhaps some relevant
correlate drawn from another religious tradition. They will naturally
draw on that conception when they attempt to determine whether or not
the state’s accommodating religious objectors is good for society in the
aggregate and over the long run. And they might rationally be persuaded
that the state should accommodate religious objectors because doing so
provide citizens with the social space to engage in the religious practices
that help them to flourish in accord with God’s design plan for human
beings. For them, commitment to religious accommodation will therefore
be a religious commitment.
It could, moreover, be an ineliminably religious commitment. Citizens
and public officials who accept some variation on the Augustinians
conception of human nature and well-being might rationally conclude
that only the religiously amplified version of the consequentialist argument
is compelling, such that they would not find the consequentialist argument
compelling but for their Augustinian precommitment. In that case,
plausibly, both religious and secular considerations play a decisive role
in persuading them to support a practice of religious accommodation.158
As I see it, there need be nothing even slightly morally troubling should
a state policy, but this condition can be satisfied when different citizens are each
persuaded by different and perhaps incompatible reasons. I should note that Gaus and
Vallier lay down this requirement only for coercive state policies rather than noncoercive
policies, as the policy of accommodating religious objectors arguably is. See Gaus &
Vallier, supra, at 53–54.
158. Let me briefly explain this last claim. A religious reason, R, plays a decisive
role in justifying state policy, P, just in case P would not be permissible in the absence of
R, that is but for R. On this understanding, R can play a decisive role in justifying P
even if it is not the only or exclusive rationale for P. So, for example, suppose that some
secular reason S provides substantial but insufficient support for P. Suppose further that
R provides substantial but insufficient support for P, whereas those reasons jointly render
P permissible. I think that a moral and epistemic peer might reach this conclusion after
assessing the consequentialist argument for accommodating religion and its religious
amplification. In that case, P is justified but not in the absence of R. Of course, since
the parallel point is also true of S, it follows that, in the case under consideration, both
religious and secular reasons play a decisive role in justifying P. I think that when
religious reasons do play a decisive justificatory role, they will typically do so in this
collaborative manner. That is, even when religious reasons play a decisive justificatory
role, they will almost always do so with substantial and necessary secular support. Perhaps
this is the case with respect to religious accommodation. Even if that policy decisively
depends on religious considerations for its justification, it also depends decisively on
secular considerations as well.
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citizens and public officials in a liberal polity such as the United States
support and advocate for a policy of accommodating religious objectors
even though it cannot, they believe, be justified absent religious
augmentation. For them, the state’s policy of accommodating religion
would be a component of a religious Vision of the Good. On that score,
at least, Leiter need not object, for he sensibly rejects the aspiration to state
neutrality associated with so-called public reason liberalism and argues
that a modern pluralistic state may establish any number of competing
Visions of the Good—both secular and religious.159
XI. ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGION ONLY?
I want to conclude this discussion by addressing one final question:
whether a state that accommodates religious objectors ought also to
accommodate secular objectors.160 It might seem that the consequentialist
argument that I have articulated vindicates only religious accommodation.
That is, it might seem that the various distinctive features of the religious, as
well as the religious considerations that augment the consequentialist
case for accommodation, imply that the state should accommodate religious
objectors but not secular objectors. I do not draw this conclusion. As I
see it, the state should accommodate certain secular objectors. So, religious
objectors are not unique in meriting accommodation. That said, religious
objectors are distinctive in meriting accommodation. What does this
mean? Having a religiously grounded objection to a given law is sufficient
for a citizen to be exempted from that law—subject to familiar constraints.
By contrast, having a secularly grounded objection to a given law is not
sufficient for a citizen to be exempted from that law; unlike the religious,
only some secular objectors should be accommodated. In that respect,

159. LEITER, supra note 1, at 13. Leiter’s primary constraint on the establishment
of a Vision of the Good, whether religious or secular, is that it respects liberty of
conscience: “[W]hat I will call henceforth ‘a Vision of the Good’—a vision, broadly
speaking, of what is worthwhile or important—is compatible with toleration as long as it
does not have as its purpose to burden coercively minority claims of conscience, beyond
what would be licensed by the Harm Principle.” Id. at 118–19 (footnote omitted).
160. I hope that it is obvious that distinguishing between religious and secular
objectors is a mere convenience. Religious objectors are those who object to a law for
religious reasons, and secular objectors are those who object to a given law for secular
reasons. Of course, a deeply religious person can object to a given law for exclusively
secular reasons, in which case that religious person is, for purposes of accommodation, a
secular objector.
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religious objectors are, as a class, distinct from secular objectors. Let me
now explain this distinctive but not unique, all religious, some secular,
practice of accommodation, though I do not intend to provide anything
like a systematic defense. I will have to leave the details to some future
effort.
I begin with the assumption that accommodation comes with potentially
substantial moral costs. If a given law, L, is supposed to achieve some
important moral good, then exempting some citizens from the requirement
that they obey L might impede the state from achieving the target
good—to some extent at least. Presumably, the greater the number of
exempt citizens, the less likely that L will achieve its intended good. And
for the state to exempt any and all objectors would defeat the purpose of
achieving goods by enacting L as a law. On this score, Leiter is surely
correct. A policy according to which the state exempts any and all
objectors, whatever their reasons—secular or religious—is a recipe for
political anarchy.161 Plausibly, then, we need to discriminate between
different kinds of objectors—some should enjoy the benefits of
accommodation and some need not. Plausibly again, that discriminating
judgment will depend on a gross and difficult to formalize assessment
that balances relevant costs and benefits. In the nature of the case, that
assessment will be controversial among moral and epistemic peers—no
doubt reflecting the conflicting precommitments on which we cannot but
do rely when we make such judgments.
Recognizing the epistemically precarious condition in which we find
ourselves, how should we make that cut? I suggest that we distinguish
between objectors on the basis of the normative weight of the reasons
that sincerely lead a given citizen to object to an otherwise justified law.
What is normative weight? The best way to convey the idea is by example.
So, consider a range of reasons on the basis of which a citizen might object
to being conscripted by the state to go to war:
 Conscription prevents Jane from satisfying her desire regularly
to enjoy ice cream.
 Conscription requires Jane to engage in strenuous exercise,
which she really detests.
 Conscription prevents Jane from regularly enjoying ice cream
and requires her to engage in strenuous exercise—the combined
prospect of which makes her absolutely miserable.
 Conscription greatly increases Jane’s chances of suffering
grave physical and psychological harm.

161.
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 Conscription prevents Jane from fulfilling her promise to
care for her elderly parents.
 Conscription requires Jane to kill innocent human beings.
 Conscription requires Jane to kill innocent human beings and
thereby excludes her from membership in the pacifist
community that helps to define her identity.
 Conscription requires Jane to kill innocent human beings,
excludes her from membership in the pacifist community
that helps to define her identity, and renders her an enemy of
God—with all that enmity with God entails.
 Conscription requires Jane to kill innocent human beings,
excludes her from membership in the pacifist community that
helps to define her identity, and holds out the prospect that
she will be reincarnated as a lesser animal.162
Each of the reasons just listed counts against Jane’s being conscripted by
the state to go to war. So, to focus on one, suppose that Jane’s being
conscripted will involve her playing some non-negligible role in killing
innocent human beings. Innocent human beings have a right not to be
killed, and their right not to be killed implies a moral obligation on Jane’s
part to refrain from killing them. The fact that she is morally obliged not
to kill those innocents counts against her going to war, and thus constitutes a
reason that counts against the state’s employing its coercive power to
compel her to go to war. Of course, the original supposition might not be
correct: it might not be the case that conscription will involve Jane in
killing innocents. Nevertheless, Jane sincerely affirms that supposition and
so she has what she takes to be a compelling reason to object to her being
conscripted.
Note that the reasons that lead Jane to object to her being conscripted
are distinct from her other subjective attitudes towards the prospect of
killing innocents: the emotions and aversions evoked in her by the
impending possibility that she will take innocent human life and the
162. There are no doubt a number of complicating additions we might make to this
list. So, for example, suppose that conscription requires Jane to forego engaging in a
practice that she takes to be conducive to, but not necessary for, achieving a good of the
greatest weight, say, a future life of eternal friendship with God. This is a very weighty
reason that counts greatly against her being conscripted, far more so than, say, the fact
that conscription precludes her from keeping her promise to go to Disney World with her
child. I realize that some will find this judgment controversial. So be it. My aim in
offering this list is to illustrate, not to systematize.
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evaluative role that Jane’s commitment to refrain from killing innocents
plays in her life projects. More particularly, the fact that Jane’s belief
that being conscripted to go to war would require her to kill innocents
counts against her being conscripted whether or not she is intensely averse
to killing innocents and whether or not her belief that she ought not do
so plays a guiding role in determining her other life choices.163 Her
sincerely held reason for objecting to conscription is one thing, the
subjective importance to her of acting in accord with that reason is another,
and the two can come apart.164 But as with the rest of her species-mates,
Jane is a complicated—and potentially corrupt—creature. It could be the
case that she is not really all that averse to killing innocents—she might

163. Of course, these can vary depending on the particularities of Jane’s circumstances;
at one point in her life she can be intensely opposed to killing innocents and at another
point indifferent to the prospect.
164. The reason that I distinguish so sharply between believed normative weight
and other subjective attitudes is that some theorists have articulated an account of
religious accommodation that seems similar to the account that I suggest here, but that
also seems to me to be vitiated by the fact that they confuse normative weight and
subjective intensity. I have in mind here the position developed by Charles Taylor and
Jocelyn Maclure. They claim that the state ought to accommodate citizens whose
objections are grounded on their “core” or “meaning-giving” commitments. MACLURE &
TAYLOR, supra note 27, at 76. It seems to me that they understand the notion of a core or
meaning-giving commitment functionally: “[C]ore beliefs and commitments, including
religious ones, must be distinguished from other personal beliefs and preferences
because of the role they play in individuals’ moral identity.” Id. Commitments that do
not play this role do not merit accommodation: “If beliefs and preferences do not
contribute toward giving a meaning and direction to my life, and if I cannot plausibly
claim that respecting them is a condition for my self-respect, then they cannot generate
an obligation for accommodation.” Id. at 76–77. They also associate core commitments
with psychological intensity: “[T]he intensity of the person’s commitment to a given
conviction or practice” is the similarity between religious and secular convictions by
virtue of which they both deserve accommodation. Id. at 97. I cannot here discuss these
claims in detail. Suffice to say that a properly functioning person who sincerely believes
that a given reason has very great normative weight will ordinarily intensely desire to act
in accord with that reason. Again, that reason will ordinarily play a role in forming his
moral identity. But intensity of feeling and relevance to moral identity are a function, in
central part, of believed normative weight. Moreover, believed normative weight need
not translate into intensity of feeling or importance to moral identity, just as importance
to identity or intensity of feeling need not be tied to normatively weighty reasons.
Human beings can shape their identities, or be quite passionate, about comparatively
trivial projects—sexual conquest, or the success of a local soccer team, or the acquisition
of money. Subjective mattering and normative weight can come apart, and when they
do, it seems to me that normative weight should be the decisive factor in determining
accommodation. Why this is the case I hope to explain on some other occasion. Here, I
am merely trying to lay out the main elements of the position I favor.
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even have some corrupt desire to do so—and yet she still has reason to
object to being conscripted.165
Not only do each of the reasons listed above count against Jane’s being
conscripted but each of those reasons also differ with respect to normative
weight. The fact that being conscripted to go to war prevents Jane from
satisfying her desire to eat ice cream counts less against her being conscripted
than does the fact that conscription prevents Jane from satisfying her
desire to eat ice cream and requires Jane to engage in strenuous exercise,
which she detests.166 The fact that being conscripted to go to war prevents
Jane from satisfying her desire to eat ice cream counts far less against her
being conscripted than does the fact that fighting in war involves her
killing innocent human beings. The fact that fighting in war involves Jane’s
killing innocent human beings counts far less against her being conscripted
than does the fact that fighting in war involves her killing innocent human
beings and excludes her from the community that defines her identity and
renders her an enemy of God. Each additional normative consideration
increases the aggregate normative weight of Jane’s reasons for objecting
to conscription.167 Of course, the distinction between believed normative
weight and subjective mattering remains in force. Although decently
socialized and properly functional human beings will enjoy some rough
correlation between believed normative weight and subjective mattering,
the two kinds of mental state can come apart. Jane might care less about
reasons that she believes to have great normative weight than she does
about reasons that she believes to have far less normative weight.168

165. In fact, Jane might strenuously insist that she not be conscripted both because
she believes that this will involve her killing innocents and because she desires to do so,
and so she will be tempted further to corrupt herself, by action and not merely by desire.
166. As I noted earlier, any number plus something must be greater than that number
alone.
167. I realize that the epistemology of these claims is mysterious, as is the epistemology
of morality generally. That is just another way of saying that although these claims seem
true, it is very difficult to justify them—certainly to anyone who determinately rejects
them.
168. It is a sad and troubling fact that human beings can care far less about killing
innocent human beings than they do about being deprived of familiar creature comforts,
even though they are well aware of the difference in normative weight between the two.
This is commonly acknowledged in the testimony of combat soldiers, the most compelling of
which is E.B. SLEDGE, WITH THE OLD BREED: AT PELELIU AND OKINAWA 152–53 (1981).
Also relevant is the more recent book by Jim Frederick. JIM FREDERICK, BLACK HEARTS:
ONE PLATOON’S DESCENT INTO MADNESS IN IRAQ’S TRIANGLE OF DEATH 257 (2010).
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Whether or not Jane should be accommodated depends on which reasons
lead her to object to conscription. As I see it, Jane should not qualify for
exemption if her reason for objecting lies at the top of the list; that
conscription frustrates her desires. Again, she should qualify for exemption
if her reason for objecting to conscription lies at the bottom of the list;
enmity with God and reincarnation at a lesser state are exceedingly
weighty reasons. But of course, between these terminal reasons there is a
vast and complex diversity of distinct reasons for objecting to conscription.
I do not believe that there is any way to specify exactly where to draw
the line. Or better, there are many sensible, appropriate ways to draw the
line. One of these sensible, appropriate ways to make the required
distinction is the traditional, conservative position that the state must
accommodate those citizens, and only those citizens, whose reasons for
objecting have the greatest normative weight. The idea is that this
constrained practice of accommodation has the best results in the long
run and in the aggregate. Exempting only a few, and only those with the
weightiest objections, achieves the optimal balance between the reduction
of alienation among those subject to the law and the goods to be achieved
by that law. In effect, this understanding implies that the state ought to
accommodate all and only religious objectors. Given that religion involves
the normative amplification of reasons for action, religious objectors will
always have reasons located at the upper end of the spectrum of normative
weight, and so they all qualify for accommodation. Given again that
religious reasons involve normative amplification, they will always have
greater normative weight than secular reasons, and so it could be the
case that only religious reasons qualify for accommodation.
That said, we are not compelled to make the relevant cut between the
religious and the secular. So, for example, we might draw the line at
convictions of conscience: if Jane sincerely believes that being conscripted
will involve her violating a moral obligation, then the state should exempt
her from being conscripted. And the state should do so irrespective of
whether she has religious or secular reason for believing that conscription
will involve her in violating that obligation. Here again, however,
judgments about normative weight seem relevant. For Jane intentionally to
kill a human being is a far greater wrong than is her failure to keep a
promise to her parents—even a very important one, such as to take care
of them late in life. Plausibly, the state ought to refrain from forcing
Jane to go to war if she adduces as her reason that going to war will involve
her killing innocent human beings. The state need not do so, however, if

Both are superlative reflections on the troubling effects of combat on the moral emotions
of soldiers.
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Jane adduces as her reason any number of lesser moral requirements,
such as the fact that going to war precludes her from taking care of her
parents late in life, much less that this prevents her from fulfilling her
promise to take her son to Disney World for his thirteenth birthday.
Plausibly, some secular reasons of conscience qualify Jane for
accommodation and many do not.
What this indicates, I think, is that the state may adopt a policy that
discriminates systematically in favor of religion but not uniquely so.
Religious objectors as a class qualify for accommodation. The state
should accommodate those who adduce religious reasons as a basis for
their objecting to a given law, but familiar caveats apply: no accommodation
for those who believe that they have a religious duty to sacrifice children.
This is by virtue of the fact that religion involves the normative amplification
of reasons for action. Secularly grounded objections depend on the
particulars. Those who object on the basis of mere preference do not
qualify for accommodation: to accommodate those who merely want not
to obey a law for which there is a perfectly fine rationale really is to
court anarchy. Those who object on the basis of moral requirement might
qualify for exemption, depending on the moral requirement involved.
Violating a requirement not to kill innocents is one thing, but violating a
requirement to keep one’s promises is quite another. So it seems that the
state should recognize an important asymmetry between the religious and
the secular: all of the former qualify for accommodation, but only some
of the latter. Religion deserves special, beneficial treatment; treatment
that is distinctive, but not unique, to religious objectors.169

169. As I see it, this asymmetrical policy is the mirror image of a familiar position
on another topic in the vicinity, that is, the proper role of religious reasons is political
discourse. According to one popular view, religious reasons cannot, as such, play a
decisive role in justifying coercive policies in liberal polities. They are excluded from
playing that justificatory role as a class. By contrast, secular reasons are not excluded as
a class. Some secular reasons can decisively justify state coercion and some cannot.
Those that cannot share some feature in common with religious reasons—inaccessibility
is a popular candidate, or some other supposed epistemic defect or disability. Those
within the privileged class of potentially decisive justificatory reasons share the
complementary property: accessibility. I do not believe that there is a coherent and
otherwise defensible formulation of this position. I hope that the same is not the case of
the asymmetrical view of religious accommodation that I suggest here.
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